 {"id":4561,"date":"2026-05-21T15:00:38","date_gmt":"2026-05-21T15:00:38","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/cilj\/?p=4561"},"modified":"2026-05-21T15:00:39","modified_gmt":"2026-05-21T15:00:39","slug":"the-ghost-fleet-dilemma-when-enforcement-timescales-fail-wartime-needs","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/cilj\/2026\/05\/21\/the-ghost-fleet-dilemma-when-enforcement-timescales-fail-wartime-needs\/","title":{"rendered":"The Ghost Fleet Dilemma: When Enforcement Timescales Fail Wartime Needs"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>Oil sanctions allow countries or international bodies to apply economic pressure on a sanctioned country. For example, G7 sanctions currently are in effect for Russian oil over a $47.60 per barrel price cap. Russian oil under this cap is not under sanction, provided that the carrying tankers themselves have not been sanctioned. The efficacy of these sanctions depends in large part on how difficult they are to circumvent. With an estimated 76% of the international oil trade being seaborne, sanctioned countries are left to either comply with the sanctions or attempt to continue operations while avoiding detection. The latter involves oil tankers with the strategic objective of anonymity. These are often referred to as \u201cghost fleets.\u201d Leading policy estimates suggest that around one in every six active oil tankers belongs to Russian operators, employing obscure flags and shell companies. For these tankers, avoiding detection is essential. Once these ships are identified as \u201cghost fleets,\u201d they can no longer appear legitimate<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Oil sanctions allow countries or international bodies to apply economic pressure on a sanctioned country. For example, G7 sanctions currently are in effect for Russian oil over a $47.60 per barrel price cap. Russian oil under this cap is not under sanction, provided that the carrying tankers themselves have not been sanctioned. The efficacy of&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":58,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[13,14,468],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4561","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-articles-2","category-current-issue","category-volume-58-issue-4"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/cilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4561","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/cilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/cilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/cilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/58"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/cilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4561"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/cilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4561\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4563,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/cilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4561\/revisions\/4563"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/cilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4561"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/cilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4561"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/cilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4561"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}