{"id":917,"date":"2014-03-08T22:59:16","date_gmt":"2014-03-08T22:59:16","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/cornellilj.org\/?p=917"},"modified":"2014-03-08T22:59:16","modified_gmt":"2014-03-08T22:59:16","slug":"tis-nobler-to-trade-slings-and-arrows-unwinding-japanese-arms-export-bans","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/cilj\/2014\/03\/08\/tis-nobler-to-trade-slings-and-arrows-unwinding-japanese-arms-export-bans\/","title":{"rendered":"'Tis Nobler To Trade Slings and Arrows: Unwinding Japanese Arms Export Bans, Vol. 2"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

CC Image Courtesy of mrhayata<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2018Tis Nobler To Trade Slings and Arrows:<\/strong> Unwinding Japanese Arms Export Bans<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

by Noah Black*<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In a move that flies in the face of close to fifty years of national tradition, Japan\u2019s Prime Minister, Shinz\u014d Abe, has begun pushing to dissolve the country\u2019s ban on weapons exports. Rooted in the country\u2019s pacifist post-war constitution,[1] the ban on exports has morphed over the course of its lifetime, growing in response to domestic, anti-war sentiment and shrinking in the face of international obligations. As a result, the law poses a dilemma: it deliberately handicaps Japanese industry in favor of a political ideal that is now beginning to shift. Over the past decade, this law has seen its force slowly dissolve as Japan has pursued industrial growth and international, military cooperation through the increased production of weapons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This essay begins with a discussion of the history of Japan\u2019s Three Principles on Arms Exports, the basis of the limitations. It then examines Abe\u2019s proposed plan to lift these limits. The essay argues that the policy now stands at a point of conflict, where it must be either maintained at a burdensome economic cost or jettisoned in favor of economic and military expansion. While this poses an almost existential dilemma, to maintain the policy is to allow the political considerations of the past to exert a dead hand over the present.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

I. History of the Three Principles<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The initial limits on weapons exports came from Prime Minister Eisaku Sato in the 1960s.[2] Responding to political opposition to Japanese support of American efforts in the Vietnam War, Sato proposed the Three Principles on Arms Exports, which the Japanese government later adopted in 1967.[3] The Three Principles forbid weapons exports to three \u201ccategories\u201d of countries: communist bloc countries, countries subject to U.N. Security Council weapons embargoes, and \u201ccountries involved in or likely to be involved in international conflicts.\u201d[4] Then, in a move to further link this trade policy with the \u201cpacifist spirit of the Japanese Constitution,\u201d[5] Prime Minister Takeo Miki tightened the restrictions in 1976 by expanding the ban to include all countries, effectively halting all Japanese weapons exports.[6]<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The 1976 ban stood as the epitome of limitations. Subsequent international developments have led to a series of \u201creviews\u201d of the export ban. Each new reexamination has edged away from Miki\u2019s heightened restrictions. For instance, in 1983, pressures to conform to the Japan-U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement led to a limited approval to trade \u201carms-related technology\u201d to the U.S.[7] In the wake of North Korean missile tests in the early 2000s, Japan further relaxed trade with the U.S. to allow ongoing review and approval of exports on a case-by-case basis.[8] The most recent deviation from the Three Principles came in 2011, when the Security Council of Japan allowed exports to assist with international peacekeeping, development, and humanitarian missions.[9]<\/p>\n\n\n\n

II. Proposed Revisions<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Abe\u2019s proposed revisions cut into both the Three Principles and the 1976 blanket ban.[10] Dispensing with the Cold War\u2019s relics, the revisions envision the Japanese government no longer banning weapons exports to communist nations, thereby dropping the first principle.[11] Additionally, the revision would replace the expansive, presumptive ban with a much looser principle, permitting exports that \u201ccontribute to Japan\u2019s national security.\u201d[12] While proposed exports would still have to undergo review\u2014especially since two of the Three Principles would remain\u2014the broad language of the new standard would dramatically expand the potential scope of exports.[13] Furthermore, the review process, undertaken by the Prime Minister\u2019s appointed Security Council, would be confidential, unlike the current review regime that issues public opinions.[14]<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Unwinding the regulations plays into Abe\u2019s domestic and foreign policy goals. The reform may potentially spark expansion in Japanese manufacturing sectors. Reuters noted that Japanese defense contractors would particularly benefit from the revisions,[15] an important economic benefit given a domestic defense industry that has grown \u201cincreasingly sclerotic\u201d[16] under the export constraints. Additionally, this boost to the defense industry is part of Abe\u2019s larger effort, dubbed \u201cproactive pacifism,\u201d to expand Japan\u2019s military presence in order to counter China\u2019s rising influence.[17]<\/p>\n\n\n\n

III. Political-Philosophical Conundrum<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Without revision, the current, restrictive state of Japanese law stands in the way of both Japanese foreign policy and economic development. This potential opening of markets to the Japanese defense industry perhaps fits into Abenomics, the nation\u2019s current fiscal policy that seeks to combine stimulus spending, quantitative easing, and structural reform.[18] Abe instituted the policies to drag the Japanese economy out of the sluggish swamp that it has been stuck in for the past twenty years.[19]  The third tactic of Abenomics \u2013 structural reform \u2013 is the policy\u2019s longest-term goal, one aimed at boosting both exports and foreign direct investment.[20] The pursuit of this goal in the weapons industry entangles economic prosperity with the nation\u2019s moral underpinnings, but clinging to the Three Principles threatens to undermine a critical extension of the nation\u2019s long-term economic development strategy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, Japan\u2019s recent foreign policy indicates a turn from idealism to pragmatism in the face of growing regional threats and economic concerns.[21] Some have criticized Abe\u2019s \u201cproactive pacifism\u201d as a linguistic fa\u00e7ade that masks an about-face from the Japanese Constitution\u2019s commitment to pacifism.[22] Here too the country\u2019s commitment to pacifism clashes with its demand for development. Given the decades of reexaminations that have marginally eroded the high point of the 1976 total export ban, the country seems to have set its course on further sacrificing high ideals for concrete economic benefits.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A sacrosanct view of the Three Principles ignores their own grounding in politics. They too arose out of the pressures of their day\u2014demands by the Japanese Socialist Party responding to Japanese involvement in the Vietnam War.[23] The inherent morality of these claims and the pacifist ideals they draw on for strength were a reaction to socio-political contexts that are now distant.[24] If law in any way reflects a nation\u2019s ideals, which here so concretely the Japanese policies do, then as the circumstances defining those ideals change, so too must the law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For a PDF of this article in formal, law-journal format, click here<\/a>.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Citation:<\/strong> Noah Black, \u2018Tis Nobler To Trade Slings and Arrows:<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Unwinding Japanese Arms Export Bans<\/em>, 2 Cornell Int\u2019l L.J. Online 23 (2014).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

       * Noah Black is a J.D. candidate at Cornell Law School, where he is the Cornell International Law Journal<\/em>\u2019s Senior Online Editor. He holds a B.A. in English from Rhodes College.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

       [1] Nihonkoku Kenp\u014d [Kenp\u014d][Constitution], pmbl.; art. 9 (Japan).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

       [2] Yukari Kubota, Research Inst. for Peace and Sec., Japan\u2019s New Strategy as an Arms Exporter 1 (2008), available at<\/em> http:\/\/www.rips.or.jp\/research\/RIPS_Policy_Perspectives_7.pdf.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

       [3] Id<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

       [4] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Japan\u2019s Policies on the Control of Arms Exports,<\/p>\n\n\n\n

http:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/policy\/un\/disarmament\/policy\/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2014).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

       [5] See<\/em> Kubota, supra<\/em> note 2, at 1.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

       [6] Murayama Yu\u0304zo\u0304, A Review of the Three Principles on Arms Exports, <\/em>nippon.com (Feb. 9, 2012), http:\/\/www.nippon.com\/en\/currents\/d00016\/.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

       [7] Id<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

       [8] Id.<\/em> (noting the motivating effect that North Korean missile tests had in drawing Japan and the U.S. into closer cooperation to develop missile defense technologies), see also<\/em> Kubota, supra<\/em> note 2, at 2\u20133 (characterizing the ad-hoc review of potential defense technology exports as a \u201cfundamental problem\u201d that has prevented policy from keeping pace with the nation\u2019s security, industry, and technology necessities).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

       [9] See<\/em> Yuzo, supra<\/em> note 6.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

       [10] Japan Moving to Lift Arms Export Ban<\/em>, Asahi Shimbun (Dec. 6, 2013) http:\/\/ajw.asahi.com\/article\/behind_news\/politics\/AJ201312060062.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

       [11] Id.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

       [12] Id.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

       [13] Id.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

       [14] Id.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

       [15] Yuka Obayashi, Japan May Lift Arms Export Ban for International Groups: Kyodo<\/em>, Reuters, Feb. 11, 2014, available at<\/em> http:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/2014\/02\/11\/us-japan-weapons-idUSBREA1A05T20140211.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

       [16] Ankit Panda, Japan Mulling Lifting Defense Export Ban: \u2018Proactive Pacifism in Action?<\/em>, The Diplomat (Feb. 13, 2014) http:\/\/thediplomat.com\/2014\/02\/japan-mulling-lifting-defense-export-ban-proactive-pacifism-in-action\/.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

       [17] Martin Fackler, Amid Chinese Rivalry, Japan Seeks More Muscle<\/em>, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 2013, at A8, available at<\/em> http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2013\/12\/18\/world\/asia\/japan-moves-to-strengthen-military-amid-rivalry-with-china.html.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

       [18] Abe\u2019s Master Plan<\/em>, The Economist (May 18, 2013) available at<\/em> http:\/\/www.economist.com\/news\/leaders\/21578044-shinzo-abe-has-vision-prosperous-and-patriotic-japan-economics-looks-better.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

       [19] Id<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

       [20] Shinzo Abe, The Third Arrow of Abenomics: TINA<\/em>, The World Post (July 3, 2013), http:\/\/www.huffingtonpost.com\/shinzoabe\/abenomics-third-arrow_b_3538422.html<\/p>\n\n\n\n

       [21] Timur Dabadev, Japan\u2019s Search for Its Central Asian Policy Between Idealism and Pragmatism<\/em>, 53 Asian Survey 506, 508 (2013).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

       [22] Editorial, Abe\u2019s \u2018Proactive\u2019 Pacifism Should Not be Used to Promote Collective Self-defense<\/em>, Asahi Shimbun (Sept. 28, 2013), https:\/\/ajw.asahi.com\/article\/views\/editorial\/AJ201309280023 (\u201cAbe seems to be using the term \u2018pacifism\u2019 only as a means to win public support for his attempt to allow Japan to exercise its right to collective self-defense by changing the government\u2019s interpretation of the Constitution concerning this issue.\u201d).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

       [23] See<\/em> Kubota, supra<\/em> note 2, at 1.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

       [24] Cf<\/em>. D. Bradley Gibbs, Note, Future Relations Between the United States and Japan: Article 9 and the Remilitarization of Japan<\/em>, 33 Hous. J. Int\u2019l L. 137, 151\u201355, 174\u201375 (2010\u20132011) (arguing that the growing threats of North Korea and China, the overextension of U.S. military commitments, and the ongoing trend of flexible reading of Article 9 to allow for an ever-expanding Japanese Self-Defense Force all favor an amendment to the substance of Article 9 to make manifest Japan\u2019s remilitarization and to free the country from its outmoded, self-imposed restraints\u2014an argument paralleling the claim that economic necessity should override the pacifist outgrowths of Article 9 that currently limits arms exports).<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

CC Image Courtesy of mrhayata \u2018Tis Nobler To Trade Slings and Arrows: Unwinding Japanese Arms Export Bans by Noah Black* In a move that flies in the face of close to fifty years of national tradition, Japan\u2019s Prime Minister, Shinz\u014d Abe, has begun pushing to dissolve the country\u2019s ban on weapons exports. Rooted in the…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":924,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[13,17],"tags":[42,66,71,177,178,250,251,299,305,364,395,429],"class_list":["post-917","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-articles-2","category-forum-archive","tag-abenomics","tag-arms-exports","tag-asia","tag-export-reform","tag-export-restrictions","tag-japan","tag-japanese-constitution","tag-nihonkoku-kenpo","tag-pacifism","tag-shinzo-abe","tag-three-principles","tag-weapons-exports"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/cilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/917","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/cilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/cilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/cilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/cilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=917"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/cilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/917\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/cilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/924"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/cilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=917"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/cilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=917"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/cilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=917"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}