{"id":926,"date":"2014-03-10T20:06:21","date_gmt":"2014-03-10T20:06:21","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/cornellilj.org\/?p=926"},"modified":"2014-03-10T20:06:21","modified_gmt":"2014-03-10T20:06:21","slug":"egypts-constitution-the-narrative-of-counter-revolution","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/cilj\/2014\/03\/10\/egypts-constitution-the-narrative-of-counter-revolution\/","title":{"rendered":"Egypt\u2019s Constitution: The Narrative of Counter-Revolution, Vol. 2"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

CC Image Courtesy of Ramy Raoof<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Egypt\u2019s Constitution: The Narrative of Counter-Revolution<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

by Jordan Calazan Manalastas*<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Was Secretary of State John Kerry right to remark, last July, that the Egyptian military\u2019s coup d\u2019\u00e9tat<\/em> was \u201crestoring democracy\u201d?[1] Perhaps not, if his sobered response to Egypt\u2019s recent constitutional referendum is any indication.[2] On one hand, a spectacular 98.1 percent of voters lent their assent this January to the regime\u2019s new constitution.[3] But on the other hand, virtual unanimity is not so impressive when policemen hound the evening streets of Cairo to arrest those who dare to hang posters saying \u201cNo to the Constitution.\u201d[4]<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For a country whose revolution was so thrillingly modern,[5]the counter-revolution has been a dreary affair. Aside from the expected and customarily grisly sprees of violence, the modus operandi<\/em> of the now-ascendant military regime has been to restore, under the pretense of legal legitimacy, the hallmarks of the status quo.[6] Ensconced in the military\u2019s imposed legitimacy, other government branches have further silenced the not-so-loyal opposition\u2014the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood\u2014by labeling them a terrorist organization.[7] And it is at the mercy of the judiciary that Brotherhood-backed ex-president Muhammad Morsi now kneels, toppled last year by a military putsch to stand trial for \u201cinsulting the judiciary.\u201d[8] Liberal theorists often strain to analyze law<\/em> distinctly from power<\/em>;[9] in Egypt, it is hard to think of the new constitution as anything but<\/em> Old Power, codified, with the judiciary and legislative branches serving merely as its agents.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is rather telling, then, that the new constitution opens with reference to \u201cthe beginning of history.\u201d[10] At the outset, the constitution declares its commitment to the old; this potential symbol of change has devolved into merely the latest prop in the repertoire of counter-revolution. Admittedly, the archetypal instance of non-revolutions is none other than the American Revolution.[11] Charges of American imperialism are as old as the nation itself\u2014which is not a trivial accusation for a state premised on the repudiation of empire. W.E.B. Du Bois once said, for example, that American blacks occupied \u201cin their economic and political condition a distinctly colonial status;\u201d[12] and race is only the most obvious and pernicious blemish of post-revolutionary America.[13] With property relations and social hierarchy as the benchmarks, the colonial uprising\u2019s ideals seem woefully distant.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Still, if the American revolutionaries can boast of any achievement worthy of the name, it would have to be theoretical<\/em>. Philosophically, the Revolution heralded the concept of sovereignty vested in the people, and the Founders framed a constitutional structure that sought painstakingly to instantiate that concept, even if it took years for all Americans to get those rights.[14] At the very least, the American Revolution announced a rupture with the narrative of history. By denouncing monarchial privilege, it made liberty the sole raison d\u2019\u00eatre<\/em> of government.[15]<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Where America tried to break with the past, Egypt\u2019s constitution makes narrative continuity the whole point.[16] The constitution does not trace its genealogy to the 2011 ousting of the autocrat Mubarak (nor even to last year\u2019s coup<\/em>), but rather to \u201cthe dawn of human conscience\u201d\u2014when, the preamble assures us, mankind\u2019s first and foremost feat was \u201cto build the first central state.\u201d[17] This is not man in a state of nature, banding together in a social pact as an existential compromise; this is man vindicating<\/em> his existence through authority.[18] Granted, the preamble eventually cedes that the people are \u201cthe source of authority.\u201d[19] Yet this appears only after affirming and applauding the long and storied \u201cbond between the Egyptian people and their patriotic army that bore the trust and responsibility of protecting the homeland.\u201d[20]<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There are two noteworthy effects of this narrative continuity. First, it renders Egypt\u2019s seesaw between dictatorship and military overthrow less a series of hiccups, and more like par for the course. Here, the constitution does not announce a new<\/em> Egypt birthed from the labor of revolution, but instead declares the maturation<\/em> of an ancient nation dating to the pharaohs, one in which the military has always held a place. The military\u2019s political custodianship is simply and legitimately embedded in the process of national evolution; indeed, the army is Egypt\u2019s so-called \u201cpillar.\u201d[21] Secondly, the narrative reaffirms what the exemplary men and women in Tahrir Square knew all along: that the army is an entity distinct from the people, whose destiny depends to an alarming degree on those in power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the context of the army’s longstanding role in Egyptian history\u2014and the preamble’s affirmation of that role\u2014certain constitutional provisions seem rather conspicuous. The power of the military is deeply embedded in this new constitution as Article 201 places at the army\u2019s helm a commander-in-chief appointed from among the army.[22] Article 234 subjects the commander-in-chief\u2019s appointment to the approval of the army\u2019s own Supreme Council.[23] To add insult to unaccountability, the military\u2019s budget is determined not by legislators, but by the National Defense Council.[24] This is to say nothing of less obviously militant matters\u2014like Shari\u2019a being \u201cthe principle source of legislation,\u201d[25] or freedom of religious practice being restricted to the \u201crevealed religions.\u201d[26] With these terms embedded in the constitution itself, it seems as though there will simply be more of the old.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It may be premature to wax pessimistic on a constitution only recently approved, but the narratives behind law provide their own premonitions. In Egypt, the constitution legitimizes the narrative paradigm of bloated, ancient authority, inseparable from military primacy and prerogative. One would have hoped to see \u201cthe heart of the whole world\u201d[27] do better.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For a PDF of this article in formal, law-journal format, click here<\/a>.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Citation:<\/strong> Jordan Calazan Manalastas, Egypt’s Constitution: The Narrative of Counter-Revolution<\/em>, 2 Cornell Int\u2019l L.J. Online 27 (2014).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

* Jordan Calazan Manalastas is a J.D. candidate at Cornell Law School, where he is the Cornell International Law Journal\u2019s Associate on Middle Eastern Affairs and a research associate for the Legal Information Institute. He holds an A.B. in political theory from the University of California, Los Angeles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[1] Michael R. Gordon & Kareem Fahim, Kerry Says Egypt\u2019s Military Was \u2018Restoring Democracy\u2019 in Ousting Morsi<\/em>, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 2013, at A7, available at<\/em> http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2013\/08\/02\/world\/middleeast\/egypt-warns-morsi-supporters-to-end-protests.html.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[2] See<\/em> John Kerry, Remarks by Secretary of State John Kerry on Egypt\u2019s Constitutional Referendum (Jan. 18, 2014) (transcript available at http:\/\/www.state.gov\/secretary\/remarks\/2014\/01\/220036.htm).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[3] See<\/em> David D. Kirkpatrick, Overwhelming Vote for Egypt\u2019s Constitution Raises Concern<\/em>, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 2014, at A7, available at<\/em> http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2014\/01\/19\/world\/middleeast\/vote-validates-egypts-constitution-and-military-takeover.html.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[4] See<\/em> Egypt: Activists Arrested for \u2018No\u2019 Campaign<\/em>, Human Rights Watch (Jan. 13, 2014), http:\/\/www.hrw.org\/news\/2014\/01\/13\/egypt-activists-arrested-no-campaign.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[5] See, e.g., <\/em>Sam Gustin, Social Media Sparked, Accelerated Egypt\u2019s Revolutionary Fire<\/em>, Wired, (Feb. 11, 2011 2:56 PM), http:\/\/www.wired.com\/business\/2011\/02\/egypts-revolutionary-fire\/.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[6] See <\/em>Greg Bortelho, Josh Levs & Ian Lee, Egypt on Edge After at Least 278 Killed in Bloodiest Day Since Revolution<\/em>, CNN, (Aug. 15, 2013, 10:51 AM), http:\/\/www.cnn.com\/2013\/08\/14\/world\/meast\/egypt-protests\/.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[7] See<\/em> Salma Abdelaziz and Steve Almasy, Egypt\u2019s Interim Cabinet Officially Labels Muslim Brotherhood a Terrorist Group<\/em>, CNN (Dec. 25, 2013 4:17 PM), http:\/\/www.cnn.com\/2013\/12\/25\/world\/africa\/egypt-muslim-brotherhood-terrorism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[8] See<\/em> Sarah El Deeb, Egypt Prosecutors Send Ex-President to New Trial<\/em>, AP Big Story (Jan. 19, 2014), http:\/\/bigstory.ap.org\/article\/egypt-prosecutors-send-ex-president-new-trial.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[9] See, e.g., <\/em>H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals<\/em>, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 602\u20133 (1958).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[10] The Arab Republic of Egypt Draft Constitution Dec. 2, 2013, pmbl., available at<\/em> http:\/\/www.atlanticcouncil.org\/images\/publications\/20131206EgyptConstitution_Dec.pdf.pdf.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[11] Jonathan Adelman, Historically, Egypt\u2019s Revolution is More of the Same<\/em>, Reuters (July 8, 2013), http:\/\/blogs.reuters.com\/great-debate\/2013\/07\/08\/historically-egypts-revolution-is-more-of-the-same\/ (noting that while the American Revolution is often cited as a \u201cbastion of liberty,\u201d the reality of the initial government-making failed to carry out this ideal, and expansive, principled liberty was only achieved through a long process of democratic expansion).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[12] W.E.B. Du Bois, The Colonial Groups in the Postwar World<\/em>, in<\/em> Against Racism: Unpublished Essays, Papers, Addresses, 1887\u20131961 229, 229 (Herbert Aphteker ed., 1985).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[13] See <\/em>Adelman, supra <\/em>note 11.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[14] See generally<\/em> U.S. Const.; Adelman, supra <\/em>note 11.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[15] See<\/em> The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (\u201c[T]o secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men.\u201d).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[16] The Arab Republic of Egypt Draft Constitution, Dec. 2, 2013, pmbl.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[17] Id.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[18] Id.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[19] Id.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[20] Id.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[21] Id.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[22] See<\/em> id.<\/em> at art. 201.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[23] See<\/em> id.<\/em> at art. 234.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[24] See<\/em> id.<\/em> at art. 203.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[25] Id.<\/em> at art. 2.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[26] Id.<\/em> at art. 64.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[27] Id.<\/em> at pmbl.\n<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

CC Image Courtesy of Ramy Raoof Egypt\u2019s Constitution: The Narrative of Counter-Revolution by Jordan Calazan Manalastas* Was Secretary of State John Kerry right to remark, last July, that the Egyptian military\u2019s coup d\u2019\u00e9tat was \u201crestoring democracy\u201d?[1] Perhaps not, if his sobered response to Egypt\u2019s recent constitutional referendum is any indication.[2] On one hand, a spectacular…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":934,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[13,17],"tags":[62,118,149,150,151,338,389],"class_list":["post-926","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-articles-2","category-forum-archive","tag-arab-spring","tag-counter-revolution","tag-egypt","tag-egyptian-army","tag-egyptian-constitution","tag-revolution","tag-tahrir-square"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/cilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/926","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/cilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/cilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/cilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/cilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=926"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/cilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/926\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/cilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/934"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/cilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=926"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/cilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=926"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/cilj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=926"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}