{"id":4167,"date":"2022-11-17T15:59:14","date_gmt":"2022-11-17T15:59:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/live-journal-of-law-and-public-policy.pantheonsite.io\/?p=4167"},"modified":"2022-11-17T15:59:14","modified_gmt":"2022-11-17T15:59:14","slug":"toward-a-u-s-cuba-detente","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/jlpp\/2022\/11\/17\/toward-a-u-s-cuba-detente\/","title":{"rendered":"Toward a U.S.-Cuba D\u00e9tente\ufffc"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

(Source<\/a>)<\/p>\n

The United States and Cuba share a long, complex history<\/a>\u2014from allies to enemies when, in 1959, Fidel Castro overthrew Fulgencio Batista, President of Cuba\u2019s then U.S.-backed government, in the establishment of a socialist state. During the half-century that followed, successive U.S. administrations economically and diplomatically isolated the island country, most notably through the imposition of the U.S. embargo against Cuba<\/a>, effectively preventing American businesses from conducting trade with Cuban interests. Under the Obama administration, the alliance was finally renewed<\/a> in what has become known as \u201cthe Cuban thaw.\u201d<\/a> Then, under the Trump administration, these initiatives were immediately undone<\/a>. Now, under the Biden administration, it remains to be seen whether President Biden will follow through on his campaign promises<\/a> to \u201creverse the failed Trump policies.\u201d However, one thing is certain<\/a>: \u201cCuba remains . . . a thorn in the side of US foreign policy.\u201d<\/p>\n

Upon taking office, President Biden\u2019s commitment to foreign policy was evident<\/a>, but his commitment to U.S.-Cuba policy less so<\/a>. Given then-Vice President Biden\u2019s foreign policy achievements under the Cuban thaw<\/a> and the subsequent \u201cwarm[ing] up [of] one of the Cold War\u2019s last icy spots in the Western Hemisphere,\u201d and given then-presidential candidate Biden\u2019s aforementioned campaign promises<\/a>, some shift in U.S.-Cuba policy was to be expected. However, the newly-troubled relationship<\/a> between the United States and Cuba\u2014the fact that former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo moved<\/a> to place Cuba on the list of countries supporting terrorism, and that Cuba would<\/a> also be expected to show that it is prepared to make concessions on human rights issues to the United States\u2014only made matters worse.<\/p>\n

Later that year, neither the historic resignation<\/a> of the Castro regime, \u201cending more than six decades of rule by either Fidel or Raul Castro,\u201d nor the historic anti-regime protests<\/a> in Havana, \u201cthe country\u2019s largest demonstrations in nearly three decades,\u201d sparked the Biden administration to action. In response to the resignation, former White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki said<\/a>, \u201cA Cuba policy shift or additional steps is currently not among the President\u2019s top foreign policy priorities,\u201d and, to the protests, President Biden stated<\/a>, \u201cThe United States calls on the Cuban regime to hear their people and serve their needs at this vital moment rather than enriching themselves,\u201d with no policies or practices in place to enact any meaningful change in U.S.-Cuba relations.<\/p>\n

Finally, after over one year in office, on May 16, 2022, the Biden administration took the first step<\/a> in renewing \u201csupport [for] the Cuban people, providing them additional tools to pursue a life free from Cuban government oppression and to seek greater economic opportunities,\u201d with measures<\/a> which included reinstating the Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program, restoring U.S. flights to airports other than Havana, and removing the $1,000 quarterly limit on family remittances. However, this progress was tainted after just one month when the Biden administration announced it would bar Cuba from the Summit of the Americas<\/a>, where heads of state and government from throughout the Western Hemisphere come together to discuss and advance solutions to common policy issues, citing<\/a> \u201cthe challenges that the[] . . . regime[] pose[s] to some of the central tenets of the Summit,\u201d like democratic governance and values, despite also referencing<\/a> \u201cthe United States[\u2019] . . . excite[ment] to invite and amplify diverse voices into the hemispheric dialogue.\u201d<\/p>\n

In the face of these inconsistent steps towards reconciliation, reporters pushed back and, each time, the Biden administration\u2019s usual political jargon followed. In one such instance, Secretary of State Antony Blinken was asked<\/a>, \u201cIf the U.S. is treating other dictatorships the same way, why treat Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua in one way and China and Saudi Arabia in a different way?\u201d Secretary Blinken pointed to certain \u201cunderlying principles,\u201d including \u201cthe principle that we need to be standing up for the rights of people when they\u2019re being repressed in one way or another.\u201d The Biden administration\u2019s Department of State Press Briefings<\/a> since then have been equally vague. In response to another reporter\u2019s characterization<\/a> of U.S.-Cuba relations as \u201ca case of a big state trying to dominate a smaller state,\u201d Department of State Spokesperson Ned Price instead characterized it as \u201ca case of the United States seeking to help advance the democratic aspirations of the people of Cuba.\u201d<\/p>\n

The Biden administration has faced further criticism in regards to its relationship with Cuba across both sides of the aisle. Some, like Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair Bob Menendez, have denounced the Biden administration\u2019s measures as excessive, saying<\/a> that \u201c[May 16, 2022\u2019s] announcement risks sending the wrong message to the wrong people, at the wrong time and for all the wrong reasons,\u201d essentially characterizing these measures as a gift to Cuban communism. Others, like former Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes, have criticized the Biden administration\u2019s measures as insufficient, saying<\/a> that \u201chis administration is \u2018gaslighting\u2019 Havana by maintaining and even expanding harsh sanctions imposed by former President Trump.\u201d At the international level, similar criticism has been leveraged. On November 3, 2022, 185 countries voted in favor of U.N. General Assembly Draft Resolution A\/77\/L.5<\/a>, \u201cNecessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba,\u201d for the thirtieth consecutive year, with only the United States and Israel voting against.<\/p>\n

But as history shows<\/a>, \u201cdecades of U.S. isolation of Cuba have failed to accomplish our objective of empowering Cubans to build an open and democratic country.\u201d Acknowledging that certain long-term issues may remain unresolved during the Biden administration, like closing Guant\u00e1namo Bay detention camp<\/a>, which the Obama administration could not do, there are several areas where President Biden could move relatively quickly. First, President Biden could reopen diplomatic channels\u2014having already restaffed the U.S. embassy in Havana<\/a>, the Biden administration could revive constructive bilateral dialogues on security issues, especially those related to \u201cthe Havana syndrome,\u201d<\/a> which, during the Trump administration<\/a>, \u201cset off a chain of events that led to a reversal of Obama\u2019s policy . . . but which U.S. officials no longer endorse.\u201d Second, following in his former boss\u2019 footsteps<\/a>, President Biden could return the United States to a policy of engagement with Cuba by encouraging government-to-government interaction and people-to-people linkages, whether at institutionalized gatherings, like the Summit, or educational and cultural affairs. Third, in what would be the most meaningful change to ensconcing the policy of normalization, President Biden could encourage Congress to fully or partially repeal the U.S. embargo against Cuba, implementing those changes if granted or executive actions to further ease the embargo himself if refused.<\/p>\n

While reviving and fine-tuning engagement with Cuba, the Biden administration may continue to face entrenched opposition at home. The FIU Cuba Poll<\/a>, \u201cthe longest-running research project tracking opinions of the Cuban-American community in South Florida,\u201d found that \u201cthe community\u2019s . . . overall tendency is to maintain a strong hold on the \u2018stick\u2019 policies that promote sanctions and isolation.\u201d Nevertheless, the Poll also found that \u201cthe community\u2019s isolationist views have softened a bit among the young and newest arrivals,\u201d a good indication that times are changing. Cuba, too, is ripe for change<\/a> in light of \u201ccrippling COVID-19 challenges and the mounting global food, fuel, and inflation crises.\u201d Charting a new course in U.S. relations with Cuba\u2014one not dissimilar to the Obama administration\u2019s\u2014is the only way toward a U.S.-Cuba d\u00e9tente. After all, the future of the Cuban people depends on it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Sasha Brigante is a second-year student at Cornell Law School, where, in addition to her involvement with the Farmworker Legal Assistance Clinic, she also serves as President of Cornell\u2019s Cuban American Bar Association and Co-Director of Cornell\u2019s International Refugee Assistance Project.<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n

Suggested Citation: Sasha Brigante, Toward a U.S.-Cuba D\u00e9tente<\/em>, Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol\u2019y, The Issue Spotter (November 17, 2022), https:\/\/live-journal-of-law-and-public-policy.pantheonsite.io\/toward-a-u-s-cuba-detente.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Sasha Brigante is a second-year student at Cornell Law School, where, in addition to her involvement with the Farmworker Legal Assistance Clinic, she also serves as President of Cornell\u2019s Cuban American Bar Association and Co-Director of Cornell\u2019s International Refugee Assistance Project.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":4168,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[18,1],"tags":[879],"class_list":["post-4167","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-feature","category-uncategorized","tag-jlpp"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4167","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4167"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4167\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/4168"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4167"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4167"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4167"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}