 {"id":5109,"date":"2011-10-20T01:00:00","date_gmt":"2011-10-20T01:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/jlpp\/?p=5109"},"modified":"2025-05-09T14:23:44","modified_gmt":"2025-05-09T14:23:44","slug":"how-our-law-executed-troy-davis","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/jlpp\/2011\/10\/20\/how-our-law-executed-troy-davis\/","title":{"rendered":"How Our Law Executed Troy Davis"},"content":{"rendered":"How could this happen? A few weeks ago, on September 21, Troy Davis was executed for murdering a police officer in Georgia, despite seven witness recantations and even an alleged confession from another man. So how is it that <em>all<\/em> of Troy\u2019s appeals failed?\n\nBelow, I\u2019m going to explain what are widely considered to be the <em>big<\/em> legal issues in the case. I must preface this by saying that in doing so, I am choosing to focus on <em>certain<\/em> appeals filed by Troy Davis and his attorneys.\n\nIn a Georgia state court in 1991, <a href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Troy_Davis_case\">Troy Davis was convicted<\/a> of murdering a police officer and sentenced to death.\n\nIn 1992, Troy began his <strong>state direct appeals<\/strong>. In accordance with Georgia capital punishment law, Troy\u2019s case was automatically appealed directly to the Georgia Supreme Court. Troy\u2019s trial attorneys were appointed to represent him on appeal, while a new attorney was appointed to review the record for effective assistance of counsel. The key here is recognizing that direct appeals don\u2019t allow the inmate to do much in terms of new evidence. Troy could not have re-interviewed witnesses; <a href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Appeal#Direct_Appeal\">these appeals<\/a> are limited to allegations of procedural errors by the trial court. By 1993, his convictions were <a href=\"http:\/\/multimedia.savannahnow.com\/media\/DavisMcPhail\/1992\/03211992CONVICTIONUPHELD.pdf\">affirmed in the Georgia Supreme Court<\/a> and the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear his appeal.\n<blockquote>a <strong>writ of habeas corpus<\/strong> is a petition filed by prisoners which essentially says \u201cprison warden, you are illegally holding me in custody, because I did not do what you say I did\u2014prove otherwise or set me free.\u201d Inmates can seek this remedy only <em>after<\/em> their trials and direct appeals have failed.\n<blockquote><em>So is this different then a prisoner just appealing his conviction? <\/em>\n<blockquote>Yes\u2014once direct appeals have failed, this is the prisoner\u2019s next (and final) resort. Prisoners can do much more with habeas appeals than direct appeals\u2014they can re-interview witnesses, introduce new evidence, etc.<\/blockquote>\n<\/blockquote>\n<\/blockquote>\nIn 1994, Troy began his <strong>state habeas corpus appeals<\/strong>. It is important to note that there is <a href=\"http:\/\/www.deathpenaltyproject.org\/authorities\/293\">no \u2018right to counsel\u2019 for death penalty convicts seeking habeas relief<\/a>, the theory being that a \u2018right to counsel\u2019 for direct appeals should be sufficient for constitutional purposes. Troy\u2019s first habeas petition failed largely because of ineffective counsel\u2014the <a href=\"http:\/\/www.time.com\/time\/nation\/article\/0,8599,1643384,00.html?cnn=yes\">nonprofit representing him lost much of its funding<\/a> and did not re-interview witnesses for the habeas petition, as it should have. The recantations and new evidence remained undiscovered. As a result: the petition was denied in 1997.\n<blockquote><strong>Antiterrorism &amp; Death Penalty Act<\/strong><span style=\"font-family: Times New Roman;\"> (<strong>AEDPA<\/strong>): The AEDPA was passed in 1996, in the wake of the Oklahoma City Bombing to \u201c<span style=\"font-family: Times New Roman;\">to deter terrorism, provide justice for victims, [and] provide for an effective death penalty.\u201d The Act made filing multiple habeas petitions <em>much<\/em> more difficult. The <a href=\"http:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/usc_sec_28_00002244----000-.html\">relevant part of the AEDPA<\/a><span style=\"font-family: Times New Roman;\"> for Troy Davis\u2019s purposes is codified in 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2244:<\/span><\/span><\/span>\n<blockquote>(b)(1) A claim presented in a <strong>second or successive habeas corpus application<\/strong> . . . <strong><span style=\"color: #3366ff;\">that was presented in a prior application<\/span><\/strong> shall be dismissed.\n\n(b)(2) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application . . . that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed unless:\n<blockquote>\n<ul>\n \t<li>\u00a7(b)(2)(A) The applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; <strong>OR<\/strong><\/li>\n \t<li>\u00a7(b)(2)(B): (i) the factual predicate for the claim <strong><span style=\"color: #3366ff;\">could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence<\/span><\/strong>; <strong>AND<\/strong> (ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, <strong><span style=\"color: #3366ff;\">no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty<\/span><\/strong> of the underlying offense.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/blockquote>\n<\/blockquote>\n<\/blockquote>\nIn 2001, with his state court appeals exhausted, Troy filed a <strong>federal habeas corpus appeal<\/strong> in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. Between 1996 and this appeal, seven of the nine eyewitnesses had changed all or part of their trial testimony.\n\nBy now, Troy was on his <u>second<\/u> habeas corpus appeal (as he had already lost his habeas petition in state court), which brought his case under the AEDPA portion quoted above. Because \u00a7 2244(b)(1) bans bringing the same habeas claims twice, he had to satisfy one of the exceptions in \u00a7 2244(b)(2) in order to move forward with this second habeas petition.\n\nTroy could not have satisfied \u00a7 2244(b)(2)(A). It is very rare that the Supreme Court makes a new ruling on constitutional law <em>and also<\/em> declares that it should apply<em> retroactively<\/em>. In death penalty law, this would be relevant to Troy if he was <a href=\"http:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supct\/html\/00-8452.ZS.html\">mentally challenged<\/a> or a <a href=\"http:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supct\/html\/03-633.ZS.html\">juvenile<\/a>, because the Supreme Court has said that it is unconstitutional to execute those inmates\u2014even if they were on death row <em>before<\/em> the new constitutionality decisions were reached.\n\nThis left Troy with \u00a7 2244(b)(2)(B), where he had to satisfy <u>both<\/u> (i) and (ii). His problem was with (i). The new evidence was theoretically attainable when he filed his first habeas petition. Although at the time he faced obstacles with counsel, he still\u2014in theory\u2014could have interviewed witnesses and presented the recantations in the first habeas proceeding. Moreover, Troy could not make an appeal arguing that his habeas counsel was ineffective because, as mentioned, he had no \u2018right to counsel\u2019 in the habeas proceeding in the first place.\n\nThat wasn\u2019t the end of Troy\u2019s problems. To even begin satisfying the criteria under \u00a7 2244(b)(2)(B), he needed to find a claim that he had not made in the previous habeas petition. He had made virtually all procedural claims in that first petition, leaving him with nothing the next go-around except a simple proclamation that he was innocent. <strong><em>This<\/em> was the big constitutional issue in Troy\u2019s case.<\/strong>\n\nWhy was that such a big deal? Because what Troy wanted to claim had never been addressed explicitly by the Supreme Court. <strong>Is it unconstitutional to execute an innocent man?<\/strong> Believe it or not, the <a href=\"http:\/\/www.thedailybeast.com\/newsweek\/2009\/09\/02\/innocent-until-executed.html\">Supreme Court has never decided this<\/a>. When the Supreme Court <a href=\"http:\/\/www.virginialawreview.org\/articles.php?article=322\">exercised its original habeas jurisdiction<\/a> in Troy\u2019s case, (something it hadn\u2019t done for any case in nearly 50 years), it remanded this very issue to the Southern District of Georgia.\n\nThe Southern District of Georgia did a thorough job and actually agreed with Troy on the primary issue\u2014that yes, <a href=\"http:\/\/www.scotusblog.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2010\/08\/Troy-Davis-ruling-DCt-Part-II-8-24-10.pdf\">it is unconstitutional to execute an obviously innocent man<\/a>.* Because of this, it seemed as though Troy\u2019s big battle was about to be won. But there was one crucial stage left. He had to prove \u201c<strong>actual innocence<\/strong>,\u201d which means that <em>no<\/em> reasonable juror could have found him guilty. Prior to the AEDPA in 1996, a defendant in Troy\u2019s position would only have to prove something termed \u201c<a href=\"http:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supct\/html\/91-6382.ZO.html\">actual innocence of the death penalty<\/a>.\u201d By changing the standard, the AEDPA made it substantially more difficult to avoid execution. To illustrate how these standards dramatically differ, here is a hypothetical:\n<div>\n<blockquote>Jones is convicted of rape and murder. He is eligible in State X for the death penalty because he not only murdered his victim, but he raped her as well.\n<blockquote>To prove \u201c<strong>actual innocence of the death penalty<\/strong>,\u201d he need only cast substantial doubt on the factor that made him eligible for the death penalty: the rape. Jones must prove he did not rape the victim, and therefore he is not eligible for the death penalty. He does not have to prove he did not murder her; he only has to disprove the factor that made him eligible for the death penalty. Thus, he may wind up in prison for life, but the remedy here is to get the death penalty portion of the conviction overturned.<\/blockquote>\n<blockquote>To prove \u201c<strong>actual innocence<\/strong>,\u201d Jones needs to cast substantial doubt on the entire conviction. Even if he has perfect proof that he did not rape the victim that he murdered, he can only get his death penalty conviction overturned if he proves he was 100% innocent of being involved in the entire incident. As you can see, this is a significantly tougher burden to meet.<\/blockquote>\n<\/blockquote>\nThus, the District Court heard Troy\u2019s \u201c<strong>actual innocence<\/strong>\u201d argument, but nevertheless concluded that the recantations were \u201csmoke and mirrors\u201d and not enough to deny that some reasonable jurors may still have convicted him. On August 24, 2010, the court concluded: \u201cTroy has failed to make a showing of actual innocence.\u201d At that legal juncture, one thing was solemnly clear: Troy\u2019s execution was imminent.\n\n*<em>Bear in mind that although the U.S. Supreme Court remanded its decision to the district court, its decision wasn\u2019t adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court so it isn\u2019t a controlling rule of the land. The District Court\u2019s lengthy opinion is available in two PDF documents: <\/em><a href=\"http:\/\/www.scotusblog.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2010\/08\/Troy-Davis-ruling-DCt-Part-I-8-24-10.pdf\"><em>Part I<\/em><\/a><em> and <\/em><a href=\"http:\/\/www.scotusblog.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2010\/08\/Troy-Davis-ruling-DCt-Part-II-8-24-10.pdf\"><em>Part II<\/em><\/a><em>.<\/em>\n\n<\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>How could this happen? A few weeks ago, on September 21, Troy Davis was executed for murdering a police officer in Georgia, despite seven witness recantations and even an alleged confession from another man. So how is it that all of Troy\u2019s appeals failed? Below, I\u2019m going to explain what are widely considered to be&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":402,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5109","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5109","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5109"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5109\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5110,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5109\/revisions\/5110"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/402"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5109"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5109"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5109"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}