{"id":5225,"date":"2025-11-09T20:38:30","date_gmt":"2025-11-09T20:38:30","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/jlpp\/?p=5225"},"modified":"2025-11-21T21:27:13","modified_gmt":"2025-11-21T21:27:13","slug":"sports-gambling-the-problem-and-potential-solutions","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/jlpp\/2025\/11\/09\/sports-gambling-the-problem-and-potential-solutions\/","title":{"rendered":"Sports Gambling: The Problem and Potential Solutions"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

(Source<\/a>)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Less than a decade ago, sports gambling was effectively outlawed throughout much of the United States. Now, it is legal in the vast majority of states, and has grown into an all-consuming<\/em><\/a> part of the culture and identity of American athletics. Television programs on broadcast networks like ESPN highlight betting lines, with commentators proposing attractive wagers. Teams like the WNBA\u2019s Indiana Fever<\/a><\/em> have partnered with betting companies. Even individual athletes, who face league-imposed<\/a><\/em> restrictions on their own bets, have signed lucrative deals<\/a><\/em> to promote betting to the general public.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This dramatic change was made possible by a 2018 Supreme Court decision, Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association<\/em><\/a>. In Murphy<\/em>, the court held that the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act<\/a><\/em> (PASPA)\u2014a 1992 law that prevented states from legalizing sports gambling\u2014violated the “anticommandeering rule\u201d and was therefore unconstitutional. As a result, states were given back control of their own gambling laws, and many immediately made use of this allowance. Just seven years after Murphy<\/em>, 39 states<\/a><\/em> allow sports betting in some form.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The decision by states to legalize gambling has been driven by a few powerful incentives. States themselves stand to benefit from increased tax revenue. While differences in state tax schemes<\/a><\/em> have resulted in wildly varying<\/a><\/em> gains, the potential exists for significant revenue to be generated as a result of legalization and high tax rates. Likewise, sportsbooks\u2014seeking to expand the betting market\u2014have used powerful lobbying tactics<\/a><\/em> to influence politicians. Finally, while public opinion<\/a><\/em> on sports betting has soured over time, a significant appetite for gambling remains, and many consumers are able to gamble responsibly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Despite the recent legalization and expansion of sports betting, it has been the focus of extensive opposition and criticism. Betting has been linked<\/a><\/em> to online harassment of athletes, for example. Stars like Jalen Brunson and Josh Hart of the New York Knicks have commented<\/a><\/em> on the extensive abuse they receive via social media, including death threats, racial slurs, and requests for money from angry bettors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Also concerning to opponents is sports betting\u2019s potential to cause or facilitate gambling<\/em> addiction<\/em><\/a>. Sports betting, especially when done online<\/a><\/em>, poses an incredible risk because of its combination of high accessibility and large economic costs<\/a><\/em>. The harm caused by addiction is devastating and has already been used as a central argument<\/a><\/em> against legal sports betting.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Of specific concern to sports fans, however, is the cost that gambling has imposed on the legitimacy and culture of American sports. Betting scandals have long<\/a><\/em> been a part of sports. However, the rise of legal betting has recently created unprecedented tension<\/a><\/em> between fans, players, and leagues. Take the National Football League (NFL), which historically maintained a firm<\/a><\/em> stance against any appearance of corruption from betting. Following Murphy<\/em>, the NFL abruptly softened its attitude. Starting in 2018, the NFL allowed<\/a><\/em> its players, previously banned from participating in any sports betting, to bet on non-NFL games. In 2021, the NFL even announced<\/a><\/em> direct partnerships with sportsbooks. Yet, despite the increasingly lax attitude adopted by the league, suspensions<\/a><\/em> <\/em>for gambling\u2014once a rare occurrence\u2014have become relatively common.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Other leagues have dealt with similar issues. The defining scandal of the post-Murphy<\/em> era involved a relatively unknown basketball player, Jontay Porter. Following an investigation by the National Basketball Association (NBA), Porter was accused<\/a><\/em> of betting against his team and of intentionally underperforming by feigning an injury and leaving a game. In January 2025, Porter pled guilty<\/a><\/em> to a federal charge of conspiracy to commit wire fraud.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is important to note that players recently subjected to bans and, in Porter\u2019s case, arrest, were likely caught precisely because of the change in the betting landscape. Major sports leagues, including the NBA, actively monitor online betting<\/a><\/em> in order to flag suspicious activity and conduct investigations. This level of enforcement would not be possible if bets were placed, as used to be the case, illegally with underground bookies. Indeed, NBA Commissioner Adam Silver made this argument<\/a><\/em> back in 2014, well before the landscape that exists today had begun to form.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, from a fan perspective, the benefit created by more efficient and effective monitoring and punishment for players and conspirators simply cannot outpace the institutional harm caused by the normalization and promotion of betting by leagues. Punishment of gambling violations only serves to cement in the mind of fans the potential for manipulation, and when the punishment comes from the same officials who make deals with sportsbooks and allow betting in stadiums<\/a><\/em>, it appears hypocritical.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Likewise, the earning potential created by sports betting has begun to creep into the presentation of sports themselves. In an environment without pervasive gambling, sports leagues focus on selling the sport itself as a product. They sell this product through exciting action and the meaning attached to specific teams, rivalries, and players. With the introduction of significant financial incentives for leagues from gambling revenue, the product they sell has increasingly become the possibility of individual financial gain (which, of course, most bettors will not actually achieve). In this sense, leagues are now marketing an individual, rather than collective, experience.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus, legalized sports betting is not just an important public health risk; it also undermines the fundamental fan experience that has made sports so popular in the first place. As a result of these costs, it is time for a legal challenge to sports betting.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Existing scholarship<\/a><\/em> has extensively covered the potential role of the law in directly regulating the sports betting market to make it more efficient. Writers have uniformly noted the need for more consistency<\/a><\/em> between states to address inefficiencies created by the many existing regulatory regimes, which are unique to individual states. The obvious answer to this problem is federal legislation. While Murphy<\/em> invalidated PASPA\u2019s prohibition on state-level legislation, the court specifically noted<\/a><\/em> that Congress could regulate sports betting directly if it wished to do so, presumably using the Commerce Clause. And Congress in fact still regulates the betting market via the Wire Act<\/a><\/em>, which effectively prohibits interstate sports betting but allows intrastate wagers, leading to the state-by-state differences currently in place.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Commentators concerned about betting have suggested congressional regulation in the form of restrictions on advertisements<\/a><\/em>, mandatory disclosure requirements<\/a><\/em>, and betting limits<\/a><\/em>. All of these proposals would certainly help to limit the rampant harms that have emerged in the current system. However, on a practical level, they ignore the fundamental issue that has so far doomed<\/a><\/em> all proposed legislation: Congress simply has no interest in regulating this market. Even in the immediate aftermath of Murphy<\/em>, the bipartisan Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act of 2018<\/a><\/em> failed to gain any traction. In the years since that Act\u2019s proposal, betting interests\u2014both private and state\u2014have become incredibly entrenched. Any new legislation, even if it were ultimately beneficial for the industry as a whole, would significantly disrupt the current profitable ecosystem and, therefore, is effectively dead on arrival. As such, while actual Congressional reform would be the most straightforward and effective way to curtail gambling\u2019s costs, advocates need to turn their attention elsewhere.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Specifically, a recent lawsuit<\/a><\/em> filed by the City of Baltimore should serve as an example for a broad theory of liability against sportsbooks, which can, in turn, direct them to regulate their own practices out of fear of having to make large payouts. In the suit, Baltimore lays out allegations that DraftKings and FanDuel, two popular sportsbooks, knew the danger of their products and methodically targeted customers who they knew were susceptible to gambling addiction based on analytical trends. Using these facts, Baltimore argued that the sportsbooks violated a local consumer protection law by using intentionally deceptive and abusive business practices to maximize profit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While the suit in Baltimore relies on a specific local code, the basic factual allegations can be used for a number of other causes of action. First, every state has its own set of consumer protection laws<\/a><\/em>, some of which may support a viable claim. The difficulty for plaintiffs in any such case would likely be showing actually deceptive practices on the part of sportsbooks. After all, it is common knowledge that the average bettor will lose money, and gambling advertisements already carry warnings about the dangers of gambling.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Next, using the Baltimore fact pattern, plaintiffs can also test certain tort claims. In particular, product liability seems to be a logical fit. According to the complaint filed by Baltimore, DraftKings and FanDuel each operate differently in the United States than they do in the United Kingdom. As a result of foreign regulation<\/a><\/em>, these sportsbooks took affirmative steps to protect vulnerable British users by limiting promotions and implementing age-based restrictions. Crucially, this suggests that there is an alternative method of product delivery available\u2014but not implemented\u2014which can maintain the basic utility of sports betting while providing at least some protections for users.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, potential plaintiffs should consider claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress. While such claims often fail based on the incredibly high burden of showing conduct is \u201coutrageous,\u201d the behavior of sportsbooks is shocking enough to create a legitimate argument. The Baltimore lawsuit reveals a pattern of intentional exploitation on the part of sportsbooks: tailored notifications and bonuses are given to frequent (losing) bettors\u2014in other words, the consumers most likely to be struggling with addiction. These tactics are incredibly sophisticated and have been a major force behind the increased revenue generated from gambling.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To be sure, any of these claims would face an uphill battle given that it is ultimately the bettor\u2019s own choice to continue betting, which leads to massive losses and raises significant causation questions. However, these claims are nonetheless compelling because they speak to what products liability and tort law intend to do: promote efficiency by pushing losses onto the actors with greater control over the loss-generating action. In this case, it is overwhelmingly clear that sportsbooks bear the ultimate responsibility for enabling problematic gambling behavior. It is inherently difficult for addicts to control their addictions. Yet it is remarkably easy for sportsbooks to limit the accessibility of their products to gambling addicts. They have the tools to identify problematic behavior, and they have the power to cut off users exhibiting that behavior. As such, by imposing liability on sportsbooks, courts can more accurately assign the losses that flow from gambling and subsequently force sportsbooks to take measures to limit these losses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To conclude, the legal solution to the sports betting problem largely depends on litigation based on addiction. However, the benefits from limiting the pervasiveness of betting would also be positive for sports themselves. Sports are an escape from the challenges of daily life. In their ideal form, they offer both action and community. While there has always been a historical connection between gambling and sports, this connection has grown out of control in recent years. To reclaim a positive sports culture and to make sports safer for both players and fans, the time to challenge the role of gambling is right now.


Suggested Citation<\/em>: Joe Shepard, Sports Gambling: The Problem and Potential Solutions, <\/em>Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol\u2019y, The Issue Spotter, (Nov. 9, 2025), https:\/\/publications.lawschool
.cornell.edu\/jlpp\/2025\/11\/09\/sports-gambling-the-problem-and-potential-solutions\/.

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

About the Author<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n

\n
\"\"
Joe Shepard is a second-year student at Cornell Law School. He graduated from the University of California, Santa Barbara in 2023 with a BA in History and worked in education prior to law school.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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