{"id":938,"date":"2012-10-18T18:19:00","date_gmt":"2012-10-18T18:19:00","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.jlpp.org\/old_blog\/?p=938"},"modified":"2012-10-18T18:19:00","modified_gmt":"2012-10-18T18:19:00","slug":"fair-well-a-response-to-a-farewell-to-affirmative-action","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/jlpp\/2012\/10\/18\/fair-well-a-response-to-a-farewell-to-affirmative-action\/","title":{"rendered":"Fair? Well\u2026 a response to \u201cA Farewell to Affirmative Action\u201d"},"content":{"rendered":"
\"\"<\/a>
(image via wwu.edu)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\nTo read Margaret Schmidt\u2019s blog post, <\/em>“A Farewell to Affirmative Action,<\/em>” click here<\/em><\/a>.\n\nAffirmative action can be a divisive topic, especially when university admissions programs use such policies as part of their decision-making process. Fittingly, the Cornell Law School Journal of Law and Public Policy Blog<\/a> is an ideal forum to analyze affirmative action policies as its goal is to \u201cfoster[] debate and publish[] diverse viewpoints.\u201d As such, I presumed that Margaret Schmidt\u2019s recent post, \u201cA Farewell to Affirmative Action\u201d<\/a>, was written from the standpoint of someone seriously engaged in considering the merits of affirmative action.\n\nI was wrong.\n\nUnfortunately, Ms. Schmidt used the blog to compose a piece devoid of legal analysis that over-simplified serious issues surrounding affirmative action in higher education. Indeed, throughout Ms. Schmidt\u2019s post, she fails to cite the U.S. Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause, or the Fourteenth Amendment, and instead opts to make blatantly false assertions which reflect what the reader can only surmise is a personal opinion.\n\nIn her piece, Ms. Schmidt discussed Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin<\/a>, a case considered before the Supreme Court of the United States on October 10, 2012<\/a>. The Court\u2019s decision will address whether the Equal Protection Clause permits the University of Texas at Austin to consider race as one factor in admissions decisions<\/a>. I agree with Ms. Schmidt that soon the Court may find affirmative action policies to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but not because the Supreme Court of the United States rendered a \u201cmisguided decision\u201d in prior affirmative actions cases. Rather, I believe that the Court may determine that student body diversity in higher education is not a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in admission decisions<\/a>. Judging from the content of her article, it would appear that Ms. Schmidt weighed both the merits of controversy and of substance for her piece, and clearly opted for controversy.\n\nFor example, Ms. Schmidt veers away from scholarly analysis and chooses to cast broad (and unsupported) assertions when she notes that \u201caffirmative action policies do not accomplish any<\/em><\/strong> of the objectives furthered to justify them\u2026 [and that] they create an unfair situation for any individual who does not fit into the rigidly defined category of a \u2018qualified minority candidate.\u2019\u201d [Emphasis added]. Beyond failing to support her claim, Ms. Schmidt fails to recognize the breadth of such an assertion when contrasted against such a narrow observation. Most notably, she takes issue with this \u201cunfair situation\u201d with respect to race, but fails to criticize policies that afford so-called \u201cLegacy Candidates\u201d the similar perceived advantage. Indeed, in 2009, Princeton admitted 9.2% of the applications submitted for admission, while they accepted 41.7% of alumni children applicants<\/a>. Surely, Ms. Schmidt\u2019s moral outrage should extend to such admission decisions as well.\n\nIt is disingenuous to say that affirmative action policies do not accomplish any <\/em>of their objectives. A glance as the Amicus Curie briefs for the University of Texas in this case shows that there are many associations and organizations who find that such policies not only accomplish diversity objectives within schools but also greatly enhance educational and professional communities<\/a>. Just within the legal community, the Law School Admissions Council<\/a> believes that affirmative action \u201chas been effective in facilitating optimal legal education, allowing law schools to account for numeric measures of certain cognitive skills along with many other applicant attributes, including race, in assembling a class that will maximize the educational experience of all students<\/a>.\u201d\n\nPerhaps most disturbing is Ms. Schmidt\u2019s analysis of remedial measures to address past discrimination. She notes that affirmative action benefits \u201cpeople who have suffered absolutely no discrimination\u201d and that \u201cpast discrimination definitely does not automatically influence their status today.\u201d This is patently false and a gross generalization. Indeed there is a large body of literature that shows how racial discrimination affects educational attainment<\/a>, mental<\/a> and physical<\/a> health outcomes, and socioeconomic status<\/a>. Ms. Schmidt should know that students of color \u2013 regardless of socioeconomic status \u2013 still experience discrimination, even at Cornell University<\/a>.\n\nUltimately, affirmative action policies in admission decisions will likely always draw both criticism and support, and I believe that there can and should<\/a> be informed and sophisticated discourse surrounding such controversial topics. Disappointingly, Margaret Schmidt\u2019s post did not provide for such a productive discussion, instead presenting the legal community with flawed commentary and void of support for inaccurate assertions. Instead, I will look forward to the Court\u2019s opinion in the coming weeks.","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Lyndsey Marcelino responds to Margaret Schmidt\u2019s post that analyzed the affirmative action admission policies in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":940,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[28],"tags":[100,533,660,1475],"class_list":["post-938","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-student-blogs","tag-affirmative-action","tag-education","tag-fisher-v-university-of-texas","tag-supreme-court-of-the-united-states"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/938","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=938"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/938\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/940"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=938"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=938"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/jlpp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=938"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}