{"id":506,"date":"2020-06-24T17:38:54","date_gmt":"2020-06-24T17:38:54","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/live-cornell-law-review.pantheonsite.io\/?page_id=506"},"modified":"2026-09-01T00:08:42","modified_gmt":"2026-09-01T00:08:42","slug":"home","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/","title":{"rendered":"Home"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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Volume 111, Issue <\/strong>4<\/h3>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n

Immigration Venue Exceptionalism<\/a><\/h4>\n

Stacy Caplow\u2020 & Maryellen Fullerton\u2020\u2020<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u2020Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. This Article was generously supported by the Brooklyn Law School Dean\u2019s Summer Research Stipend. This Article benefited enormously from the research assistance of Cristina Coudert Lynch, BLS \u201826, and Jean Davis, International and Foreign Law Reference Librarian.<\/p>\n

\u2020\u2020Suzanne J. and Norman Miles Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

The notion of \u201cexceptionalism\u201d has characterized immigration law for more than a century. Many constitutional and other traditional norms do not apply in the realm of immigration law. Venue, as prescribed and practiced in Immigration Courts, is yet another example of outlier conduct. Venue, a standard litigation norm, has been seriously perverted. Instead of protecting…<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n

Resistance Through Restraint: Liberal Cause Lawyering in an Age of Conservative Judicial Hegemony<\/a><\/h4>\n

Duncan Hosie<\/strong><\/p>\n

Academic Fellow, Stanford Law School.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

I thank the editors of the Cornell Law Review for their meticulous edits, especially Vanna Carter. For thoughtful conversation, I thank Reva Siegel, Doug NeJaime, and Robert Post, as well as the participants in the Yale Law School Public Law Workshop, and the Stanford Law Journals Discussion Group.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Progressive cause lawyers face a defining challenge in responding to an entrenched conservative Supreme Court majority that is systematically dismantling liberal precedent. An intuitive solution\u2014Court reform\u2014confronts insurmountable political barriers and likely constitutional challenges from the very institution it seeks to modify. Rather than pursuing continued affirmative constitutional litigation or embracing conventional reform efforts, this Article…<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n

Administrative Procedural Discretion<\/a><\/h4>\n

Bijal Shah<\/strong><\/p>\n

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Professor of Law and Provost Faculty Fellow, Boston College (BC) Law School.<\/p>\n

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The author thanks Michael Asimow, Beau Baumann, Meghan Brooks, Dominique Custos, Bridget Dooling, Blake Emerson, Frank Garcia, Hiba Hafiz, Chris Havasy, Mary Holper, Brandon Johnson, Olati Johnson, Renee Jones, Jennifer Koh, Matt Lawrence, Desiree LeClercq, Lawrence Liu, Beverly Moran, Jamelia Morgan, Joy Milligan, Melissa Powers, Sabeel Rahman, Shalini Ray, Blaine Saito, Susan Silbey, Tania Valdez, Justin Weinstein-Tull, and Alex Zhang, as well as participants in the University of Pennsylvania Law School conference on Regulatory Governance in a Changing World, University of Minnesota Law School National Immigration Law Professors conference, Boston College Law School faculty workshop, George Washington University Law School workshop on Power in the Administrative State, University at Buffalo School of Law conference on Mass Adjudication in a Changing Administrative State, Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting, Law and Society Association Annual Meeting, and the 61st Annual Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference. All errors are my own.<\/p>\n

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The conservative Supreme Court has established maximum presidential control over formal administrative adjudication, despite the resulting impact on independence and expertise in adjudicatory process. Concurrently, a progressive public law perspective advocates for agencies to be released from procedure to allow them to accomplish more, regardless of the fact that procedures create important guardrails for agency…<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n

The Federal Reserve as the World\u2019s Unofficial Central Bank<\/a><\/h4>\n

Mengyi Wang<\/strong><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Climenko Fellow and Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School.<\/p>\n

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For generous comments, suggestions, and support, I thank Bill Alford, Emilie Aguirre, Gregory Auclair, Dan Awrey, Colleen Baker, Marco Basile, Ra\u00fal Carrillo, Guy-Uriel Charles, Sabrina Charles, Felipe Cole, Nakita Cuttino, Sannoy Das, Kevin E. Davis, Christine Desan, Benjamin Dinovelli, Ryan D. Doerfler, Gemma Donofrio, Barry Eichengreen, Rui Pedro Esteves, Marc Flandreau, Jeffry Frieden, Idriss Fofana, Anna Gelpern, James Greiner, Howell Jackson, Elizabeth King, Naomi Lamoreaux, Fernando Loayza, Gr\u00e9goire Mallard, Jonathan Masur, Perry Mehrling, Michael Mitchell, Ugo Panizza, Joost Pauwelyn, Zachary Price, Adam Sandel, J\u00e9r\u00f4me Sgard, Hal Scott, Matthew Stephenson, Raphael Stern, Nathan Sussman, Edward Swaine, Martin Sybblis, C\u00e9dric Tille, Susannah Barton Tobin, Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Adrian Vermeule, Bill Watson, Mark Wu, David Zaring, and Jeffery Zhang. I also thank the participants at DebtCon8, the 7th Conference on Law & Macroeconomics, the AALS Financial Regulation Mid-Year Workshop, the ABA Administrative Law Spring Workshop, the ASIL Mid-Year Research Forum, the Harvard Law School East Asian Legal Studies Brown Bag, the JILSA Summer Workshop, and the Money as a Democratic Medium Conference.<\/p>\n

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The Federal Reserve (Fed) has quietly become the world\u2019s de facto central bank. Acting as the global lender of last resort, it has backstopped the global economy through central bank swap lines\u2014bilateral agreements with foreign central banks\u2014that supplied more than half a trillion dollars during the Global Financial Crisis and COVID-19. Five of those agreements…<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n

Whose History, Which Tradition? An Examination of Historical Sources in the Supreme Court\u2019s History-and Tradition Jurisprudence<\/a><\/h4>\n

Elliott A. King<\/strong><\/p>\n

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J.D., Cornell Law School, 2027; B.M., History and Music Performance, University of Kentucky, 2024.<\/p>\n

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I extend my gratitude to Professor Alexandra Lahav for shaping this research and to the editors of the Cornell Law Review for their thoughtful work in preparing this Note for publication. I especially thank my late father for inspiring my love of history and my mother for fostering it.<\/p>\n

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The Supreme Court\u2019s modern reliance on history and tradition has reshaped constitutional adjudication across multiple doctrinal areas, including Substantive Due Process, the Second Amendment, and the Religion Clauses. The Court has justified this methodology as a means of constraining judicial discretion by anchoring constitutional meaning in the past. Yet persistent disagreement within the Court reveals…<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n

View Current Print Issue<\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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Current Online Edition<\/h3>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n

Copyright\u2019s Invisible Hand: Subsidizing America\u2019s Cultural Institutions<\/a><\/h4>\n

Guy A. Rub<\/strong><\/p>\n

Vincent J. Marella Professor of Law, Temple University Beasley School of Law.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

The doctrine of copyright exhaustion conceals a substantial and underappreciated subsidy at the heart of American copyright law. For more than a century, it has operated as a deliberate congressional scheme transferring billions of dollars in value to cultural institutions, such as libraries, museums, and galleries. This Essay reconceptualizes copyright law as a system of…<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n

The Beginnings Of The One Big Beautiful Bill Act: Placing The 2017 Tax Cuts And Jobs Act In Historical Perspective<\/a><\/h4>\n

Amanda Borwegen & Ajay K. Mehrotra<\/strong><\/p>\n

J.D. 2025, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law; B.A. 2019, Washington & Jefferson College. <\/span>Stanford Clinton Sr. and Zylpha Kilbride Clinton Research Professor of Law, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law; Affiliated Professor of History, Northwestern University; and Research Professor, American Bar Foundation. <\/span>An earlier version of this essay was presented at the 2025 American Association of Law School Conference. We thank the participants at that conference for their useful feedback, and to those colleagues and friends who reviewed and discussed drafts of this essay including Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Ari Glogower, Christopher Hanna, Andy Koppelman, Philip Postlewaite, Samy Abdelsalam, and Maggie Amen. We are grateful to Noah Taran for excellent research assistance, and to Jeena Patel and the staff of the Cornell Law Review for their assistance. All errors, of course, remain our own.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

On July 4, 2025, President Donald J. Trump signed into law the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA). This new law was built on the foundations of its immediate predecessor, the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA). This Essay examines the historical roots and contemporary implications of these two laws. It argues that both…<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n

View Current Online Issue<\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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