{"id":1831,"date":"2020-03-03T16:12:00","date_gmt":"2020-03-03T16:12:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/live-cornell-law-review.pantheonsite.io\/?p=1831"},"modified":"2025-01-06T14:27:49","modified_gmt":"2025-01-06T14:27:49","slug":"the-nature-of-reasonableness","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/2020\/03\/03\/the-nature-of-reasonableness\/","title":{"rendered":"The Nature of Reasonableness"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\"><p><em>Though the notion of reasonableness dominates Anglo- American law, its meaning has been clouded by traditional conceptual analysis. This Essay argues that greater clarity can be gained by taking a scientific approach to the subject,&nbsp;exposing the natural foundations beneath the concept\u2019s&nbsp;varied interpretations.<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Reasonable legal minds agree that&nbsp;<em>reasonableness&nbsp;<\/em>is one of the foundational concepts of American law, infiltrating everything from administrative, corporate, and constitutional law to crimes, torts, and contracts.<sup class=\"footnote_referrer\"><a role=\"button\" tabindex=\"0\" onclick=\"footnote_moveToReference_1831_1('footnote_plugin_reference_1831_1_1');\" onkeypress=\"footnote_moveToReference_1831_1('footnote_plugin_reference_1831_1_1');\" ><sup id=\"footnote_plugin_tooltip_1831_1_1\" class=\"footnote_plugin_tooltip_text\">1<\/sup><\/a><cite class=\"footnote_tooltip\"><span class=\"footnote-inner\">1. See&nbsp;Brandon L. Garrett,&nbsp;Constitutional Reasonableness, 102 MINN. L. REV. 61, 69\u201370 (2017) (recounting the concept\u2019s significance and use within multiple legal fields); Fr\u00e9d\u00e9ric G.&nbsp;&#x2026; <span class=\"footnote_tooltip_continue\"  onclick=\"footnote_moveToReference_1831_1('footnote_plugin_reference_1831_1_1');\">Continue reading<\/span><\/span><\/cite><\/sup><script type=\"text\/javascript\"> jQuery('#footnote_plugin_tooltip_1831_1_1').tooltip({ tip: '#footnote_plugin_tooltip_text_1831_1_1', tipClass: 'footnote_tooltip', effect: 'fade', predelay: 0, fadeInSpeed: 200, delay: 400, fadeOutSpeed: 200, position: 'top center', relative: true, offset: [-7, 0], });<\/script>&nbsp;Yet the concept\u2019s&nbsp;importance and prevalence have not necessarily bred clarity. In fact, a recent flurry of analytic interpretations has only&nbsp;clouded the term\u2019s meaning.<sup class=\"footnote_referrer\"><a role=\"button\" tabindex=\"0\" onclick=\"footnote_moveToReference_1831_1('footnote_plugin_reference_1831_1_2');\" onkeypress=\"footnote_moveToReference_1831_1('footnote_plugin_reference_1831_1_2');\" ><sup id=\"footnote_plugin_tooltip_1831_1_2\" class=\"footnote_plugin_tooltip_text\">2<\/sup><\/a><cite class=\"footnote_tooltip\"><span class=\"footnote-inner\">2. The latest entry appeared just last year in the&nbsp;Yale Law Journal Forum.&nbsp;See&nbsp;Alan Z. Rozenshtein,&nbsp;Fourth Amendment Reasonableness After&nbsp;Carpenter, 128 YALE&nbsp;L.J.F. 943&nbsp;&#x2026; <span class=\"footnote_tooltip_continue\"  onclick=\"footnote_moveToReference_1831_1('footnote_plugin_reference_1831_1_2');\">Continue reading<\/span><\/span><\/cite><\/sup><script type=\"text\/javascript\"> jQuery('#footnote_plugin_tooltip_1831_1_2').tooltip({ tip: '#footnote_plugin_tooltip_text_1831_1_2', tipClass: 'footnote_tooltip', effect: 'fade', predelay: 0, fadeInSpeed: 200, delay: 400, fadeOutSpeed: 200, position: 'top center', relative: true, offset: [-7, 0], });<\/script>&nbsp;While some scholars say reasonableness is a prescriptive standard,<sup class=\"footnote_referrer\"><a role=\"button\" tabindex=\"0\" onclick=\"footnote_moveToReference_1831_1('footnote_plugin_reference_1831_1_3');\" onkeypress=\"footnote_moveToReference_1831_1('footnote_plugin_reference_1831_1_3');\" ><sup id=\"footnote_plugin_tooltip_1831_1_3\" class=\"footnote_plugin_tooltip_text\">3<\/sup><\/a><cite class=\"footnote_tooltip\"><span class=\"footnote-inner\">3. See&nbsp;Alan D. Miller &amp; Ronen Perry,&nbsp;The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323, 326 (2012) (\u201cWe put forward and defend the argument that normative definitions [of reasonableness] are&nbsp;&#x2026; <span class=\"footnote_tooltip_continue\"  onclick=\"footnote_moveToReference_1831_1('footnote_plugin_reference_1831_1_3');\">Continue reading<\/span><\/span><\/cite><\/sup><script type=\"text\/javascript\"> jQuery('#footnote_plugin_tooltip_1831_1_3').tooltip({ tip: '#footnote_plugin_tooltip_text_1831_1_3', tipClass: 'footnote_tooltip', effect: 'fade', predelay: 0, fadeInSpeed: 200, delay: 400, fadeOutSpeed: 200, position: 'top center', relative: true, offset: [-7, 0], });<\/script>&nbsp;others believe it describes existing community values,<sup class=\"footnote_referrer\"><a role=\"button\" tabindex=\"0\" onclick=\"footnote_moveToReference_1831_1('footnote_plugin_reference_1831_1_4');\" onkeypress=\"footnote_moveToReference_1831_1('footnote_plugin_reference_1831_1_4');\" ><sup id=\"footnote_plugin_tooltip_1831_1_4\" class=\"footnote_plugin_tooltip_text\">4<\/sup><\/a><cite class=\"footnote_tooltip\"><span class=\"footnote-inner\">4. See&nbsp;Kevin P. Tobia,&nbsp;How People Judge What is Reasonable, 70 ALA. L. REV. 293, 299\u2013300 (2018) (describing this view of reasonableness as a search for the statistically average&nbsp;&#x2026; <span class=\"footnote_tooltip_continue\"  onclick=\"footnote_moveToReference_1831_1('footnote_plugin_reference_1831_1_4');\">Continue reading<\/span><\/span><\/cite><\/sup><script type=\"text\/javascript\"> jQuery('#footnote_plugin_tooltip_1831_1_4').tooltip({ tip: '#footnote_plugin_tooltip_text_1831_1_4', tipClass: 'footnote_tooltip', effect: 'fade', predelay: 0, fadeInSpeed: 200, delay: 400, fadeOutSpeed: 200, position: 'top center', relative: true, offset: [-7, 0], });<\/script>&nbsp;and still others see it as a combination of the two.<sup class=\"footnote_referrer\"><a role=\"button\" tabindex=\"0\" onclick=\"footnote_moveToReference_1831_1('footnote_plugin_reference_1831_1_5');\" onkeypress=\"footnote_moveToReference_1831_1('footnote_plugin_reference_1831_1_5');\" ><sup id=\"footnote_plugin_tooltip_1831_1_5\" class=\"footnote_plugin_tooltip_text\">5<\/sup><\/a><cite class=\"footnote_tooltip\"><span class=\"footnote-inner\">5. <em>See id.&nbsp;<\/em>at 296 (arguing that&nbsp;\u201c[r]easonableness is best understood as a hybrid notion that is partly statistical and partly prescriptive\u201d).<\/span><\/cite><\/sup><script type=\"text\/javascript\"> jQuery('#footnote_plugin_tooltip_1831_1_5').tooltip({ tip: '#footnote_plugin_tooltip_text_1831_1_5', tipClass: 'footnote_tooltip', effect: 'fade', predelay: 0, fadeInSpeed: 200, delay: 400, fadeOutSpeed: 200, position: 'top center', relative: true, offset: [-7, 0], });<\/script>&nbsp;This split is deepened by disagreements over the concept\u2019s normative basis.&nbsp;Indeed, the latest proposals ground&nbsp;<em>reasonableness&nbsp;<\/em>in a wide variety of ideals, including utilitarianism, economic efficiency, fairness, deontological respect, pragmatic rationalism, formalism, mutuality, and aretaic virtue.<sup class=\"footnote_referrer\"><a role=\"button\" tabindex=\"0\" onclick=\"footnote_moveToReference_1831_1('footnote_plugin_reference_1831_1_6');\" onkeypress=\"footnote_moveToReference_1831_1('footnote_plugin_reference_1831_1_6');\" ><sup id=\"footnote_plugin_tooltip_1831_1_6\" class=\"footnote_plugin_tooltip_text\">6<\/sup><\/a><cite class=\"footnote_tooltip\"><span class=\"footnote-inner\">6. See&nbsp;Sourgens,&nbsp;supra&nbsp;note 1, at 80\u2013105 (discussing utilitarian, pragmatic, and formalist paradigms of reasonableness); Benjamin C. Zipursky,&nbsp;Reasonableness In and Out of&nbsp;&#x2026; <span class=\"footnote_tooltip_continue\"  onclick=\"footnote_moveToReference_1831_1('footnote_plugin_reference_1831_1_6');\">Continue reading<\/span><\/span><\/cite><\/sup><script type=\"text\/javascript\"> jQuery('#footnote_plugin_tooltip_1831_1_6').tooltip({ tip: '#footnote_plugin_tooltip_text_1831_1_6', tipClass: 'footnote_tooltip', effect: 'fade', predelay: 0, fadeInSpeed: 200, delay: 400, fadeOutSpeed: 200, position: 'top center', relative: true, offset: [-7, 0], });<\/script><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Since reasonableness effectively serves as law\u2019s&nbsp;conscience, doubts about its essence are an obvious cause for concern. But the impasse also puts legal theory in a serious predicament. If reasonableness means different things to different people\u2014or, at least, different things in different legal contexts\u2014then there is little point to searching for a common unifying principle. Even if such a principle exists, traditional conceptual analysis has struggled to discover it. As jurisprudence maven Lawrence Solum recently observed, legal philosophy\u2019s exhaustive polemic on reasonableness eventually just \u201cruns out of gas.\u201d<sup class=\"footnote_referrer\"><a role=\"button\" tabindex=\"0\" onclick=\"footnote_moveToReference_1831_1('footnote_plugin_reference_1831_1_7');\" onkeypress=\"footnote_moveToReference_1831_1('footnote_plugin_reference_1831_1_7');\" ><sup id=\"footnote_plugin_tooltip_1831_1_7\" class=\"footnote_plugin_tooltip_text\">7<\/sup><\/a><cite class=\"footnote_tooltip\"><span class=\"footnote-inner\">7. Solum,&nbsp;<em>supra&nbsp;<\/em>note 6.<\/span><\/cite><\/sup><script type=\"text\/javascript\"> jQuery('#footnote_plugin_tooltip_1831_1_7').tooltip({ tip: '#footnote_plugin_tooltip_text_1831_1_7', tipClass: 'footnote_tooltip', effect: 'fade', predelay: 0, fadeInSpeed: 200, delay: 400, fadeOutSpeed: 200, position: 'top center', relative: true, offset: [-7, 0], });<\/script><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Yet the problem with these approaches is not a lack of analytic rigor. Rather, it is an absence of critical facts. What is missing from the discussion of reasonableness, I argue, is a basic understanding of human nature. Because science informs that inquiry, this Essay explores the biological origins of reasonableness by probing three of its key connotations: sensibleness, fairness, and moderation. The first meaning evokes mankind\u2019s integrated cognitive faculties; the second addresses humanity\u2019s reflexive values; and the third entails the&nbsp;coordinative processes animating human decision-making. Together, these attributes suggest that reasonableness is not an abstract, static, or monolithic ideal; rather, it is an organic, dynamic, and systemic phenomenon for satisfying our natural urge for homeostasis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>To read more, click here: <a href=\"https:\/\/live-cornell-law-review.pantheonsite.io\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/08\/Calnan-online-essay-final-version.pdf\">The Nature of Reasonableness<\/a><\/em>.<\/p>\n<div class=\"speaker-mute footnotes_reference_container\"> <div class=\"footnote_container_prepare\"><p><span role=\"button\" tabindex=\"0\" class=\"footnote_reference_container_label pointer\" onclick=\"footnote_expand_collapse_reference_container_1831_1();\">References<\/span><span role=\"button\" tabindex=\"0\" class=\"footnote_reference_container_collapse_button\" style=\"display: none;\" onclick=\"footnote_expand_collapse_reference_container_1831_1();\">[<a id=\"footnote_reference_container_collapse_button_1831_1\">+<\/a>]<\/span><\/p><\/div> <div id=\"footnote_references_container_1831_1\" style=\"\"><table class=\"footnotes_table footnote-reference-container\"><caption class=\"accessibility\">References<\/caption> <tbody> \r\n\r\n<tr class=\"footnotes_plugin_reference_row\"> <th scope=\"row\" class=\"footnote_plugin_index_combi pointer\"  onclick=\"footnote_moveToAnchor_1831_1('footnote_plugin_tooltip_1831_1_1');\"><a id=\"footnote_plugin_reference_1831_1_1\" class=\"footnote_backlink\"><span class=\"footnote_index_arrow\">&#8593;<\/span>1<\/a><\/th> <td class=\"footnote_plugin_text\"><em>See&nbsp;<\/em>Brandon L. Garrett,&nbsp;<em>Constitutional Reasonableness<\/em>, 102 MINN. L. REV. 61, 69\u201370 (2017) (recounting the concept\u2019s significance and use within multiple legal fields); Fr\u00e9d\u00e9ric G. Sourgens,&nbsp;<em>Reason and Reasonableness: The Necessary Diversity of the Common Law<\/em>, 67 ME. L. REV. 73, 74\u201375 (2014) (same).<\/td><\/tr>\r\n\r\n<tr class=\"footnotes_plugin_reference_row\"> <th scope=\"row\" class=\"footnote_plugin_index_combi pointer\"  onclick=\"footnote_moveToAnchor_1831_1('footnote_plugin_tooltip_1831_1_2');\"><a id=\"footnote_plugin_reference_1831_1_2\" class=\"footnote_backlink\"><span class=\"footnote_index_arrow\">&#8593;<\/span>2<\/a><\/th> <td class=\"footnote_plugin_text\">The latest entry appeared just last year in the&nbsp;<em>Yale Law Journal Forum<\/em>.&nbsp;<em>See&nbsp;<\/em>Alan Z. Rozenshtein,&nbsp;<em>Fourth Amendment Reasonableness After&nbsp;<\/em>Carpenter, 128 YALE&nbsp;L.J.F. 943 (2019).<\/td><\/tr>\r\n\r\n<tr class=\"footnotes_plugin_reference_row\"> <th scope=\"row\" class=\"footnote_plugin_index_combi pointer\"  onclick=\"footnote_moveToAnchor_1831_1('footnote_plugin_tooltip_1831_1_3');\"><a id=\"footnote_plugin_reference_1831_1_3\" class=\"footnote_backlink\"><span class=\"footnote_index_arrow\">&#8593;<\/span>3<\/a><\/th> <td class=\"footnote_plugin_text\"><em>See&nbsp;<\/em>Alan D. Miller &amp; Ronen Perry,&nbsp;<em>The Reasonable Person<\/em>, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323, 326 (2012) (\u201cWe put forward and defend the argument that normative definitions [of reasonableness] are categorically preferable to positive definitions because the latter are logically unacceptable.\u201d).<\/td><\/tr>\r\n\r\n<tr class=\"footnotes_plugin_reference_row\"> <th scope=\"row\" class=\"footnote_plugin_index_combi pointer\"  onclick=\"footnote_moveToAnchor_1831_1('footnote_plugin_tooltip_1831_1_4');\"><a id=\"footnote_plugin_reference_1831_1_4\" class=\"footnote_backlink\"><span class=\"footnote_index_arrow\">&#8593;<\/span>4<\/a><\/th> <td class=\"footnote_plugin_text\"><em>See&nbsp;<\/em>Kevin P. Tobia,&nbsp;<em>How People Judge What is Reasonable<\/em>, 70 ALA. L. REV. 293, 299\u2013300 (2018) (describing this view of reasonableness as a search for the statistically average characteristics of people within a community).<\/td><\/tr>\r\n\r\n<tr class=\"footnotes_plugin_reference_row\"> <th scope=\"row\" class=\"footnote_plugin_index_combi pointer\"  onclick=\"footnote_moveToAnchor_1831_1('footnote_plugin_tooltip_1831_1_5');\"><a id=\"footnote_plugin_reference_1831_1_5\" class=\"footnote_backlink\"><span class=\"footnote_index_arrow\">&#8593;<\/span>5<\/a><\/th> <td class=\"footnote_plugin_text\"><em>See id.&nbsp;<\/em>at 296 (arguing that&nbsp;\u201c[r]easonableness is best understood as a hybrid notion that is partly statistical and partly prescriptive\u201d).<\/td><\/tr>\r\n\r\n<tr class=\"footnotes_plugin_reference_row\"> <th scope=\"row\" class=\"footnote_plugin_index_combi pointer\"  onclick=\"footnote_moveToAnchor_1831_1('footnote_plugin_tooltip_1831_1_6');\"><a id=\"footnote_plugin_reference_1831_1_6\" class=\"footnote_backlink\"><span class=\"footnote_index_arrow\">&#8593;<\/span>6<\/a><\/th> <td class=\"footnote_plugin_text\"><em>See&nbsp;<\/em>Sourgens,&nbsp;<em>supra&nbsp;<\/em>note 1, at 80\u2013105 (discussing utilitarian, pragmatic, and formalist paradigms of reasonableness); Benjamin C. Zipursky,&nbsp;<em>Reasonableness In and Out of Negligence Law<\/em>, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 2131, 2160\u201365 (2015) (proposing a theory of reasonableness as mutuality); Lawrence B. Solum,&nbsp;<em>Legal Theory Lexicon: The Reasonable Person<\/em>, LEGAL&nbsp;THEORY&nbsp;BLOG&nbsp;(Apr. 21, 2019), <span class=\"footnote_url_wrap\">https:\/\/lsolum.typepad.com\/legaltheory\/2019\/04\/legal-theory-lexicon-the-<\/span> reasonable-person.html [<a href=\"https:\/\/perma.cc\/3VSX-SGJB\"><span class=\"footnote_url_wrap\">https:\/\/perma.cc\/3VSX-SGJB<\/span><\/a>] (addressing efficiency, fairness, deontological, and virtue-based notions of reasonableness).<\/td><\/tr>\r\n\r\n<tr class=\"footnotes_plugin_reference_row\"> <th scope=\"row\" class=\"footnote_plugin_index_combi pointer\"  onclick=\"footnote_moveToAnchor_1831_1('footnote_plugin_tooltip_1831_1_7');\"><a id=\"footnote_plugin_reference_1831_1_7\" class=\"footnote_backlink\"><span class=\"footnote_index_arrow\">&#8593;<\/span>7<\/a><\/th> <td class=\"footnote_plugin_text\">Solum,&nbsp;<em>supra&nbsp;<\/em>note 6.<\/td><\/tr>\r\n\r\n <\/tbody> <\/table> <\/div><\/div><script type=\"text\/javascript\"> function footnote_expand_reference_container_1831_1() { jQuery('#footnote_references_container_1831_1').show(); jQuery('#footnote_reference_container_collapse_button_1831_1').text('\u2212'); } function footnote_collapse_reference_container_1831_1() { jQuery('#footnote_references_container_1831_1').hide(); jQuery('#footnote_reference_container_collapse_button_1831_1').text('+'); } function footnote_expand_collapse_reference_container_1831_1() { if (jQuery('#footnote_references_container_1831_1').is(':hidden')) { footnote_expand_reference_container_1831_1(); } else { footnote_collapse_reference_container_1831_1(); } } function footnote_moveToReference_1831_1(p_str_TargetID) { footnote_expand_reference_container_1831_1(); var l_obj_Target = jQuery('#' + p_str_TargetID); if (l_obj_Target.length) { jQuery( 'html, body' ).delay( 0 ); jQuery('html, body').animate({ scrollTop: l_obj_Target.offset().top - window.innerHeight * 0.2 }, 380); } } function footnote_moveToAnchor_1831_1(p_str_TargetID) { footnote_expand_reference_container_1831_1(); var l_obj_Target = jQuery('#' + p_str_TargetID); if (l_obj_Target.length) { jQuery( 'html, body' ).delay( 0 ); jQuery('html, body').animate({ scrollTop: l_obj_Target.offset().top - window.innerHeight * 0.2 }, 380); } }<\/script>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Though the notion of reasonableness dominates Anglo- American law, its meaning has been clouded by traditional conceptual analysis. This Essay argues that greater clarity can be gained by taking a scientific approach to the subject,&nbsp;exposing the natural foundations beneath the concept\u2019s&nbsp;varied interpretations. Reasonable legal minds agree that&nbsp;reasonableness&nbsp;is one of the foundational concepts of American law,&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[13,16],"tags":[193,209,214,278,311,321,478,483,554,633,644],"class_list":["post-1831","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-archives","category-clr-online-volume-105","tag-cognition","tag-constitutional-law","tag-coordination","tag-emotion","tag-fairness","tag-feelings","tag-moral-psychology","tag-neuroscience","tag-reasonableness","tag-systems-science","tag-tort-law"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1831","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1831"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1831\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4655,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1831\/revisions\/4655"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1831"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1831"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1831"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}