{"id":2783,"date":"2021-01-15T18:17:00","date_gmt":"2021-01-15T18:17:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/live-cornell-law-review.pantheonsite.io\/?p=2783"},"modified":"2021-01-15T18:17:00","modified_gmt":"2021-01-15T18:17:00","slug":"second-class-citizens-under-the-second-amendment-the-case-for-applying-strict-scrutiny-to-lifetime-firearm-bans-for-individuals-previously-committed-to-mental-institutions","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/2021\/01\/15\/second-class-citizens-under-the-second-amendment-the-case-for-applying-strict-scrutiny-to-lifetime-firearm-bans-for-individuals-previously-committed-to-mental-institutions\/","title":{"rendered":"Second-Class Citizens Under the Second Amendment: The Case for Applying Strict Scrutiny to Lifetime Firearm Bans for Individuals Previously Committed to Mental Institutions"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>This Note seeks to critique the conflicting approaches that the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have taken when analyzing what Second Amendment rights, if any, individuals are entitled to after a mental institution involuntarily commits them. Additionally, this Note offers a novel solution. To do so, it explores \u201cnot the what, where, when, or why of the Second Amendment\u2019s limitations\u2014but the who.\u201d<sup class=\"footnote_referrer\"><a role=\"button\" tabindex=\"0\" onclick=\"footnote_moveToReference_2783_1('footnote_plugin_reference_2783_1_1');\" onkeypress=\"footnote_moveToReference_2783_1('footnote_plugin_reference_2783_1_1');\" ><sup id=\"footnote_plugin_tooltip_2783_1_1\" class=\"footnote_plugin_tooltip_text\">1<\/sup><\/a><cite class=\"footnote_tooltip\"><span class=\"footnote-inner\">1. Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff\u2019s Dep\u2019t. (<em>Tyler I<\/em>), 775 F.3d 308, 316 (6th Cir. 2014), vacated, 837 F.3d 678 (2016).<\/span><\/cite><\/sup><script type=\"text\/javascript\"> jQuery('#footnote_plugin_tooltip_2783_1_1').tooltip({ tip: '#footnote_plugin_tooltip_text_2783_1_1', tipClass: 'footnote_tooltip', effect: 'fade', predelay: 0, fadeInSpeed: 200, delay: 400, fadeOutSpeed: 200, position: 'top center', relative: true, offset: [-7, 0], });<\/script> Part I first discusses the modern framework for analyzing Second Amendment claims. Part II then discusses the language of \u00a7 922(g)(4), whom it affects, and why previously involuntarily committed Americans in approximately nineteen states are entirely foreclosed from seeking relief from \u00a7 922(g)(4)\u2019s lifetime firearm ban. It then offers an in-depth analysis of how the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have applied the post-Heller framework for adjudicating as-applied Second Amendment challenges to \u00a7 922(g)(4)\u2019s lifetime ban for the involuntarily committed. Part III briefly explores why the policy goals of reducing the stigma of mental illness and increasing access to mental healthcare point in favor of ensuring that presently mentally healthy individuals have the opportunity to petition for relief from \u00a7 922(g)(4)\u2019s firearm ban. Finally, Part IV offers a novel approach to analyzing Second Amendment challenges to \u00a7 922(g)(4)\u2014viewing the application of strict scrutiny as justifiable by viewing Heller\u2019s exceptions as an off switch to the Second Amendment right to bear arms. Part IV discusses why Judge Sutton\u2019s assertion \u201cthat Heller create[d] an on-off switch to the right to bear arms,\u201d<sup class=\"footnote_referrer\"><a role=\"button\" tabindex=\"0\" onclick=\"footnote_moveToReference_2783_1('footnote_plugin_reference_2783_1_2');\" onkeypress=\"footnote_moveToReference_2783_1('footnote_plugin_reference_2783_1_2');\" ><sup id=\"footnote_plugin_tooltip_2783_1_2\" class=\"footnote_plugin_tooltip_text\">2<\/sup><\/a><cite class=\"footnote_tooltip\"><span class=\"footnote-inner\">2. <em>See<\/em> Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff\u2019s Dep\u2019t. (<em>Tyler II<\/em>), 837 F.3d 678, 712 (6th Cir. 2016) (Sutton, J., concurring in part).<\/span><\/cite><\/sup><script type=\"text\/javascript\"> jQuery('#footnote_plugin_tooltip_2783_1_2').tooltip({ tip: '#footnote_plugin_tooltip_text_2783_1_2', tipClass: 'footnote_tooltip', effect: 'fade', predelay: 0, fadeInSpeed: 200, delay: 400, fadeOutSpeed: 200, position: 'top center', relative: true, offset: [-7, 0], });<\/script> although originally offered to refute the application of any form of scrutiny to \u00a7 922(g)(4)\u2019s committed provision, can also be used to support the argument that courts must analyze \u00a7 922(g)(4)\u2019s committed provision under strict scrutiny.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To read more click here: <em><a href=\"https:\/\/live-cornell-law-review.pantheonsite.io\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/03\/Devendorf-final.pdf\" data-type=\"URL\" data-id=\"https:\/\/live-cornell-law-review.pantheonsite.io\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/03\/Devendorf-final.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Second-Class Citizens Under the Second Amendment: The Case for Applying Strict Scrutiny to Lifetime Firearm Bans for Individuals Previously Committed to Mental Institutions<\/a><\/em>.<\/p>\n<div class=\"speaker-mute footnotes_reference_container\"> <div class=\"footnote_container_prepare\"><p><span role=\"button\" tabindex=\"0\" class=\"footnote_reference_container_label pointer\" onclick=\"footnote_expand_collapse_reference_container_2783_1();\">References<\/span><span role=\"button\" tabindex=\"0\" class=\"footnote_reference_container_collapse_button\" style=\"display: none;\" onclick=\"footnote_expand_collapse_reference_container_2783_1();\">[<a id=\"footnote_reference_container_collapse_button_2783_1\">+<\/a>]<\/span><\/p><\/div> <div id=\"footnote_references_container_2783_1\" style=\"\"><table class=\"footnotes_table footnote-reference-container\"><caption class=\"accessibility\">References<\/caption> <tbody> \r\n\r\n<tr class=\"footnotes_plugin_reference_row\"> <th scope=\"row\" class=\"footnote_plugin_index_combi pointer\"  onclick=\"footnote_moveToAnchor_2783_1('footnote_plugin_tooltip_2783_1_1');\"><a id=\"footnote_plugin_reference_2783_1_1\" class=\"footnote_backlink\"><span class=\"footnote_index_arrow\">&#8593;<\/span>1<\/a><\/th> <td class=\"footnote_plugin_text\">Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff\u2019s Dep\u2019t. (<em>Tyler I<\/em>), 775 F.3d 308, 316 (6th Cir. 2014), vacated, 837 F.3d 678 (2016).<\/td><\/tr>\r\n\r\n<tr class=\"footnotes_plugin_reference_row\"> <th scope=\"row\" class=\"footnote_plugin_index_combi pointer\"  onclick=\"footnote_moveToAnchor_2783_1('footnote_plugin_tooltip_2783_1_2');\"><a id=\"footnote_plugin_reference_2783_1_2\" class=\"footnote_backlink\"><span class=\"footnote_index_arrow\">&#8593;<\/span>2<\/a><\/th> <td class=\"footnote_plugin_text\"><em>See<\/em> Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff\u2019s Dep\u2019t. (<em>Tyler II<\/em>), 837 F.3d 678, 712 (6th Cir. 2016) (Sutton, J., concurring in part).<\/td><\/tr>\r\n\r\n <\/tbody> <\/table> <\/div><\/div><script type=\"text\/javascript\"> function footnote_expand_reference_container_2783_1() { jQuery('#footnote_references_container_2783_1').show(); jQuery('#footnote_reference_container_collapse_button_2783_1').text('\u2212'); } function footnote_collapse_reference_container_2783_1() { jQuery('#footnote_references_container_2783_1').hide(); jQuery('#footnote_reference_container_collapse_button_2783_1').text('+'); } function footnote_expand_collapse_reference_container_2783_1() { if (jQuery('#footnote_references_container_2783_1').is(':hidden')) { footnote_expand_reference_container_2783_1(); } else { footnote_collapse_reference_container_2783_1(); } } function footnote_moveToReference_2783_1(p_str_TargetID) { footnote_expand_reference_container_2783_1(); var l_obj_Target = jQuery('#' + p_str_TargetID); if (l_obj_Target.length) { jQuery( 'html, body' ).delay( 0 ); jQuery('html, body').animate({ scrollTop: l_obj_Target.offset().top - window.innerHeight * 0.2 }, 380); } } function footnote_moveToAnchor_2783_1(p_str_TargetID) { footnote_expand_reference_container_2783_1(); var l_obj_Target = jQuery('#' + p_str_TargetID); if (l_obj_Target.length) { jQuery( 'html, body' ).delay( 0 ); jQuery('html, body').animate({ scrollTop: l_obj_Target.offset().top - window.innerHeight * 0.2 }, 380); } }<\/script>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>This Note seeks to critique the conflicting approaches that the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have taken when analyzing what Second Amendment rights, if any, individuals are entitled to after a mental institution involuntarily commits them. Additionally, this Note offers a novel solution. To do so, it explores \u201cnot the what, where, when, or why of the Second Amendment\u2019s limitations\u2014but the who.\u201d Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff\u2019s Dep\u2019t (Tyler I), 775 F.3d 308, 322 (6th Cir. 2014), vacated, 837 F.3d 678 (2016). <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[70,46,52],"tags":[260,459,588],"class_list":["post-2783","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-issue-2-print-volume-106","category-notes","category-print-volume-106","tag-district-of-columbia-v-heller","tag-mcdonald-v-city-of-chicago","tag-second-amendment"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2783","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2783"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2783\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2783"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2783"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2783"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}