Law is increasingly being used as a weapon of war. Unable or unwilling to challenge other states militarily, states and non-state actors use legal strategies to weaken the enemy\u2019s legitimacy. Such \u201clawfare\u201d can be used to achieve a kinetic objective, to forestall one, to degrade the enemy\u2019s will to fight, and to shape the narrative of war. For example, al-Qaeda\u2019s use of human shields against U.S.-led coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan stopped the coalition from attacking certain military targets, and enabled al-Qaeda to carry the narrative of conflict among local populations when mass civilian casualties occurred. China is now the world\u2019s leading practitioner of lawfare. The Chinese military prioritizes lawfare as one of the \u201cThree Warfares\u201d that shape its military\u2019s influence operations. Meanwhile, the U.S. has no similar lawfare doctrine or strategy, even as China forces it to fight back. This Article argues that the U.S. needs to develop a lawfare strategy to combat its adversaries. It will first define the concept of lawfare and discuss how its use has evolved and escalated globally in recent years. It will illustrate this phenomenon by examining three different instances of lawfare between China and the U.S. or its allies: China\u2019s non-uniformed maritime militias, international arbitration over China\u2019s claims to the Spratly Islands, and litigation involving the U.S. and Huawei. After discussing the rise of lawfare globally, including lawfare efforts by Russia and the U.S., the Article concludes with recommendations for a U.S. lawfare strategy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n