Corporate legal personhood is a baffling and elusive concept. Are corporations persons and, if so, what does this mean?Ascribing the moniker of \u201cperson\u201d to a corporation can conjure up the idea that a corporate entity is entitled to all the natural and legal rights that natural \u201cpersonhood\u201d entails. This, however, ignores that there are different kinds of \u201clegal person\u201d and that the scope of their respective rights differs based on the purpose of the personhood they are given. This Note posits that the law grants corporations entity-hood primarily to centralize contractual rights and obligations. This purpose, this Note contends, is the root of the \u201cnexus of contracts\u201d theory\u2014a theory which suggests that corporations are not persons, but webs of contracts between their stakeholders. However, as David Gindis has noted, the nexus does not replace the corporate entity\u2014it is the corporate entity. Further, nexus of contracts can and should be repurposed as a theory of corporate entity-hood, as it offers a theoretical framework for defining and limiting the scope of this ambiguous concept. Corporations should only be granted the rights necessary to fulfill this particular kind of personhood\u2019s contractarian purpose\u2014and this fits within the Bill of Rights\u2019 individual-rights framework. Such an understanding meshes Gindis\u2019s interpretation with David Ciepley\u2019s proposal for a separate category of \u201ccorporate person\u201d in a way that preserves Ronald Coase\u2019s purposing of the firm in defining corporate rights. This Note looks at the right to freedom of speech as an example of the nexus for contracts theory\u2019s application and concludes that this right is not strictly necessary to fulfill the contractarian purpose of corporate entity-hood. This new theory can and should be applied to other rights as well, by courts and policymakers alike.<\/p>\n\n\n\n