 {"id":4307,"date":"2024-01-30T01:14:26","date_gmt":"2024-01-30T01:14:26","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.cornelllawreview.org\/?p=4307"},"modified":"2024-01-30T01:14:26","modified_gmt":"2024-01-30T01:14:26","slug":"balancing-is-for-suckers","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/2024\/01\/30\/balancing-is-for-suckers\/","title":{"rendered":"Balancing is for Suckers\u00a0"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>Balancing workers\u2019 statutory rights against employers\u2019 interests is the heart of labor law. But balancing\u2014or employers\u2019 interests, for that matter\u2014is nowhere to be found in the text of our labor statutes. Yet courts and the National Labor Relations Board routinely grind down workers\u2019 rights against this loose legal premise. Balancing is the meta-doctrine that stripped workers of their statutory rights to strike, picket, access information, and act concertedly, among others. Balancing inherently dilutes statutory rights. Yet it is practiced and preached by employers and unions, Republicans and Democrats, conservatives and liberals. This consensus is devastating. It weakens an already frail agency, channels legal professionals\u2019 biases into doctrine, and encourages employers to break workers\u2019 concerted activities using the courts\u2019 eagerness for balance. Balancing legal rights leads to an imbalanced economy. Continuing to engage in balancing labor law rights with the hope of achieving any other outcomes is, well, for suckers. There are alternatives to balancing. In other legal contexts, we rarely balance statutory rights with unenumerated interests, even if those are employers\u2019 interests. We don\u2019t balance workers\u2019 rights to a minimum wage or overtime pay with employers\u2019 legitimate business interests. We don\u2019t balance workers\u2019 right to take leave, unemployment insurance eligibility, or workers\u2019 compensation either. Here, textualism can serve labor advocates as a doctrinal path of salvaging labor law. It might be that balancing power, not interests, is labor law\u2019s goal. For that purpose, I offer a different read of our labor laws that aims to produce a balanced bargaining power between employers like Tesla, Amazon, Starbucks, or Apple and their workers. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To read this Article, please click here:<em> <a href=\"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2024\/01\/Racabi-final.pdf\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2024\/01\/Racabi-final.pdf\">Balancing is for Suckers<\/a><\/em>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Balancing workers\u2019 statutory rights against employers\u2019 interests is the heart of labor law. But balancing\u2014or employers\u2019 interests, for that matter\u2014is nowhere to be found in the text of our labor statutes. Yet courts and the National Labor Relations Board routinely grind down workers\u2019 rights against this loose legal premise. Balancing is the meta-doctrine that stripped&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[14,21,29,48,55],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4307","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-articles","category-clr-print-volume-109","category-issue-1-clr-print-volume-109","category-print","category-print-volume-109"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4307","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4307"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4307\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4307"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4307"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4307"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}