{"id":4399,"date":"2024-05-01T20:11:37","date_gmt":"2024-05-01T20:11:37","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.cornelllawreview.org\/?p=4399"},"modified":"2025-01-03T13:53:41","modified_gmt":"2025-01-03T13:53:41","slug":"a-common-law-for-the-age-of-amici-how-the-party-presentation-principle-can-help-identify-binding-precedent","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/2024\/05\/01\/a-common-law-for-the-age-of-amici-how-the-party-presentation-principle-can-help-identify-binding-precedent\/","title":{"rendered":"A Common Law for the Age of Amici: How the Party-Presentation Principle Can Help Identify Binding Precedent"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>Two recent Supreme Court cases suggest an additional dimension for the traditional test that distinguishes dicta from holding.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In the first, <em>United States v. Sineneng-Smith<\/em>, the Ninth Circuit reversed a criminal conviction based on arguments made by amici appointed by that court. The Supreme Court then reversed 9-0, holding that the Ninth Circuit\u2019s handling of the case violated the party-presentation principle\u2014the concept that courts \u201crely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In the second, <em>Dobbs v. Jackson Women\u2019s Health<\/em>, one reason given by the Supreme Court for overruling <em>Roe v. Wade<\/em> was that <em>Roe<\/em>\u2019s trimester framework \u201cwas never raised by any party\u201d in briefing that case.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This Essay examines the connection between those two statements. It concludes that the party-presentation principle can provide useful insight for the process of distinguishing&nbsp;dicta from holding.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To read this Essay, please click here: <a href=\"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2024\/05\/Coale-Online-Essay-Final.pdf\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2024\/05\/Coale-Online-Essay-Final.pdf\"><em>A Common Law for the Age of Amici: How the Party-Presentation Principle Can Help Identify Binding Precedent<\/em>.<\/a> <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Two recent Supreme Court cases suggest an additional dimension for the traditional test that distinguishes dicta from holding.&nbsp; In the first, United States v. Sineneng-Smith, the Ninth Circuit reversed a criminal conviction based on arguments made by amici appointed by that court. The Supreme Court then reversed 9-0, holding that the Ninth Circuit\u2019s handling of&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":true,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"Published: A Common Law for the Age of Amici: How the Party-Presentation Principle Can Help Identify Binding Precedent","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[26,19,1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4399","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-essay","category-online-volume-109","category-uncategorized"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4399","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4399"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4399\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4624,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4399\/revisions\/4624"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4399"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4399"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4399"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}