 {"id":4576,"date":"2024-12-18T21:37:43","date_gmt":"2024-12-18T21:37:43","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.cornelllawreview.org\/?p=4508"},"modified":"2025-01-06T13:53:31","modified_gmt":"2025-01-06T13:53:31","slug":"payment-as-punishment-establishing-college-athletes-as-employees-to-safeguard-athlete-welfare-in-the-super-conference-era","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/2024\/12\/18\/payment-as-punishment-establishing-college-athletes-as-employees-to-safeguard-athlete-welfare-in-the-super-conference-era\/","title":{"rendered":"Payment as Punishment: Establishing College Athletes as Employees to Safeguard Athlete Welfare in the &#8220;Super Conference&#8221; Era"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>This Note argues the increased profitability and shift toward \u201csuper conferences\u201d in Division I college athletics does not comport with the NCAA\u2019s \u201crevered tradition of amateurism\u201d and justifies college athletes\u2019 classification as employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Rather than making more traditional compensation arguments rooted in fairness or market value, employment status for athletes aims to prevent the diminishing of academic, athletic, and physical welfare likely to accompany competition in bicoastal conferences. The NCAA and its member universities have long insisted on maintaining athlete amateurism to prevent direct athlete compensation by member schools. The NCAA and member schools also argue there would be detrimental financial impact on universities and the institution of college sports by paying college athletes. However, in 2022, the top five college athletic conferences (the \u201cPower Five\u201d) generated more than $3.3 billion in total revenue without compensating the labor generating those dollars. Given likely increases to revenue generation and labor demands arising from Power Five conference realignment in 2024, resistance to structural change in the form of athlete compensation and labor law protections cannot be warranted. Yet instead of arguing for compensation based on the athlete\u2019s market value\u2014which poses greater funding issues for universities and primarily benefits major revenue sports\u2014minimum wage compensation under the FLSA tackles an alternative problem in college sports: abusing athlete time demands and welfare. Considering athletes as employees under the FLSA, universities would be financially incentivized to limit the number of hours athletes engage in athletically-related activities. Athletes would receive meager financial benefit compared to a market value model, but they would be entitled to basic labor law protections. Athletic departments would paradoxically be closer to achieving greater athletic and academic balance to truly allow college athletes to be \u201cstudent-athletes.\u201d While implementation presents challenges financially and may require collaboration with lawmakers, this Note firmly establishes that college athletes should be employees under the FLSA and opens the door to creatively solve problems across the college athlete experience.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To read this Note, please click here: <em><a href=\"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2024\/12\/Lukas-note-final.pdf\">Payment as Punishment: Establishing College Athletes as Employees to Safeguard Athlete Welfare in the &#8220;Super Conference&#8221; Era<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>This Note argues the increased profitability and shift toward \u201csuper conferences\u201d in Division I college athletics does not comport with the NCAA\u2019s \u201crevered tradition of amateurism\u201d and justifies college athletes\u2019 classification as employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Rather than making more traditional compensation arguments rooted in fairness or market value, employment status&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":51,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[21,692,46,48,55],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4576","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-clr-print-volume-109","category-issue-6-clr-print-volume-109","category-notes","category-print","category-print-volume-109"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4576","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/51"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4576"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4576\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4647,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4576\/revisions\/4647"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4576"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4576"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4576"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}