 {"id":4636,"date":"2024-12-16T15:07:00","date_gmt":"2024-12-16T15:07:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/test-cornell-law-school-publications.pantheonsite.io\/lawreview\/?p=4636"},"modified":"2025-07-23T21:52:16","modified_gmt":"2025-07-23T21:52:16","slug":"treating-the-administrative-as-law-responding-to-the-judicial-aggrandizement-critique-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/2024\/12\/16\/treating-the-administrative-as-law-responding-to-the-judicial-aggrandizement-critique-2\/","title":{"rendered":"Treating the Administrative as Law: Responding to the &#8220;Judicial Aggrandizement\u201d Critique"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>Modern separation-of-powers jurisprudence\u2014including key decisions decided during the Supreme Court\u2019s 2023-24 term\u2014has been critiqued on the grounds that it constitutes \u201cjudicial aggrandizement,\u201d i.e., that it impermissibly empowers federal courts to decide separation-of-powers questions better left to Congress and the President. This \u201cjudicial aggrandizement\u201d critique goes too far to the extent it suggests that federal courts may not play <em>any<\/em> role in enforcing the separation of powers. After all, ours is a system of a President and Congress constrained by a written Constitution\u2014not a King in Parliament free to act outside of judicial constraint. But the \u201cjudicial aggrandizement\u201d critique is persuasive to the extent it recognizes that federal courts must not play an <em>exclusive<\/em> role in policing the separation of powers. That is in part because, as this Essay will explain, administrative agencies can help federal courts enforce the separation of powers.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Recognizing the complementary role that agencies can play in enforcing the separation of powers may require understanding \u201claw\u201d in a new light. That new light\u2014which was actually lit more than two thousand years ago\u2014is offered by a natural law tradition. That tradition recognizes \u201claw\u201d as a tool for instilling in actors those characteristics (called \u201cvirtues\u201d) that enable actors to perform their functions excellently. Thus, by treating the \u201cadministrative\u201d (i.e., agency action) as \u201claw\u201d (i.e., a tool for instilling virtue), agencies can help legislators develop the virtues that those legislators need to perform their constitutional functions excellently.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To read this Essay, please click here: <a href=\"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2024\/12\/Squitieri-Final.pdf\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2024\/12\/Squitieri-Final.pdf\"><em>Treating the Administrative as Law: Responding to the &#8220;Judicial Aggrandizement\u201d Critique.<\/em><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Modern separation-of-powers jurisprudence\u2014including key decisions decided during the Supreme Court\u2019s 2023-24 term\u2014has been critiqued on the grounds that it constitutes \u201cjudicial aggrandizement,\u201d i.e., that it impermissibly empowers federal courts to decide separation-of-powers questions better left to Congress and the President. This \u201cjudicial aggrandizement\u201d critique goes too far to the extent it suggests that federal courts&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[13,691],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4636","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-archives","category-clr-online-volume-110"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4636","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4636"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4636\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4641,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4636\/revisions\/4641"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4636"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4636"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4636"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}