 {"id":4831,"date":"2025-07-23T22:09:48","date_gmt":"2025-07-23T22:09:48","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/?p=4831"},"modified":"2026-02-26T17:42:23","modified_gmt":"2026-02-26T17:42:23","slug":"birthright-citizenship-and-the-dunning-school-of-unoriginal-meanings","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/2025\/07\/23\/birthright-citizenship-and-the-dunning-school-of-unoriginal-meanings\/","title":{"rendered":"Birthright Citizenship and the Dunning School of Unoriginal Meanings"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>This Essay critically surveys the recent debate surrounding birthright citizenship in the United States, particularly in light of arguments presented by legal scholars Randy Barnett, Kurt Lash, and Ilan Wurman.&nbsp; Under the guise of \u201coriginalism,\u201d Barnett, Lash, and Wurman propose an ahistorical, revisionist interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Citizenship Clause.&nbsp; They suggest that the term \u201cjurisdiction\u201d should be understood as \u201callegiance,\u201d seemingly to give the veneer of legitimacy to the Trump Administration\u2019s view that the children of undocumented immigrants may not be American citizens.&nbsp; This Essay argues that their efforts to radically redefine the historical understanding of citizenship are methodologically flawed and undermine core principles of constitutional law.&nbsp; The critique exposes the inaccuracies and inconsistencies in their position and scrutinizes the scholarly merit of new theories of birthright citizenship that are wildly inconsistent with constitutional text, history, precedent, and unbroken tradition.&nbsp; This Essay concludes by examining the professional responsibility of legal scholars to engage in rigorous, fact-based historical analysis rather than politically motivated reinterpretations that threaten to destabilize fundamental constitutional rights.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To read this Essay, please click here: <em><a href=\"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2025\/07\/Birthright-Citizenship-and-the-Dunning-School-of-Unoriginal-Meanings-by-Bernick-Gowder-and-Kreis-Final.pdf\">Birthright Citizenship and the Dunning School of Unoriginal Meanings<\/a><\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>This Essay critically surveys the recent debate surrounding birthright citizenship in the United States, particularly in light of arguments presented by legal scholars Randy Barnett, Kurt Lash, and Ilan Wurman.&nbsp; Under the guise of \u201coriginalism,\u201d Barnett, Lash, and Wurman propose an ahistorical, revisionist interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Citizenship Clause.&nbsp; They suggest that the term&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":55,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[13,702,26,703,47],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4831","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-archives","category-clr-online-volume-111","category-essay","category-issue-1-clr-online-volume-111","category-online"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4831","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/55"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4831"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4831\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4840,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4831\/revisions\/4840"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4831"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4831"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4831"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}