 {"id":5017,"date":"2026-03-17T23:37:26","date_gmt":"2026-03-17T23:37:26","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/?p=5017"},"modified":"2026-03-17T23:37:27","modified_gmt":"2026-03-17T23:37:27","slug":"a-critical-analysis-of-rap-shield-laws","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/2026\/03\/17\/a-critical-analysis-of-rap-shield-laws\/","title":{"rendered":"A Critical Analysis Of Rap Shield Laws"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>For years, scholars have been sounding the alarm on \u201crap on trial,\u201d or the use of rap as evidence in criminal proceedings, pointing out that the fundamental characteristics of rap music make it uniquely susceptible to misinterpretation and prejudice. Scholars have also cautioned that rap on trial has the potential to chill artistic expression in violation of the First Amendment. The heavy reliance on rap lyrics in the recent RICO prosecution against rapper Young Thug has shed a renewed spotlight on the rap on trial concerns. In response to these growing concerns and a perceived gap in evidence law, state and federal legislators have proposed, and in some states enacted, statutes that seek to limit the use of rap lyrics as evidence\u2014what this Article refers to as \u201crap shields.\u201d&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This Article provides the first critical analysis of rap shield proposals. More specifically, this Article demonstrates that rap shield laws are largely duplicative and, therefore, unnecessary from both an evidentiary and constitutional standpoint. Nevertheless, from a social justice standpoint, rap shield serve important functions that may justify their enactment, such as offering guidance that increases judicial scrutiny and decreases judicial discretion. Those benefits, however, come with unintended costs\u2014costs that may outweigh the important functions rap shields serve\u2014including impeding defendants\u2019 rights to present a defense. This Article concludes that the administration of justice may be better served and the concerns with rap on trial better addressed when the firmly rooted canons of evidence law are stringently applied rather than amended.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To read this Article, please click here: <em><a href=\"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2026\/03\/Perez-final.pdf\">A Critical Analysis Of Rap Shield Laws<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>For years, scholars have been sounding the alarm on \u201crap on trial,\u201d or the use of rap as evidence in criminal proceedings, pointing out that the fundamental characteristics of rap music make it uniquely susceptible to misinterpretation and prejudice. Scholars have also cautioned that rap on trial has the potential to chill artistic expression in&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":67,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[62,14,694,23,25,28,692,48],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5017","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-62","category-articles","category-clr-print-volume-110","category-current-clr-print-vol","category-current-print-issue","category-issue","category-issue-6-clr-print-volume-109","category-print"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5017","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/67"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5017"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5017\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5020,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5017\/revisions\/5020"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5017"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5017"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5017"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}