 {"id":5479,"date":"2026-07-30T01:26:33","date_gmt":"2026-07-30T01:26:33","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/?p=5479"},"modified":"2026-07-30T01:51:58","modified_gmt":"2026-07-30T01:51:58","slug":"unconstitutional-but-not-unconstitutional-enough","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/2026\/07\/30\/unconstitutional-but-not-unconstitutional-enough\/","title":{"rendered":"Unconstitutional But Not Unconstitutional Enough"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">When one imagines a judge deciding whether a statute violates the U.S. Constitution, the natural question that comes to mind is whether the statute violates the constitutional doctrine raised. And that is precisely what the U.S. Supreme Court considers. But\u2014as this Article demonstrates in an original fifty-state survey\u2014this approach is far from universal. In forty-four states and the District of Columbia, there is case law instead requiring that a party arguing a legislative enactment violates the U.S. Constitution prove not only that the enactment is unconstitutional, but also that it is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Shining a light on a practice that has received little attention in scholarship, this Article demonstrates through a case study how the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof can be outcome determinative. In a Colorado appellate case, a judge found a statute under which the defendant was convicted to be unconstitutionally vague but not unconstitutionally vague beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the judge determined it was appropriate to uphold the defendant\u2019s felony convictions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This Article argues that state courts\u2019 use of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof to determine whether a legislative enactment violates the U.S. Constitution is wrong as a matter of policy and doctrine. States apply the wrong substantive federal law when they apply a heightened standard of proof to federal constitutional claims. Under the reverse-Erie doctrine, which dictates when state courts must apply federal law, state courts\u2019 application of the standard violates the Supremacy Clause. State courts play a critical\u2014and often unchecked\u2014role in adjudicating federal constitutional claims. When state courts apply the wrong constitutional law, as occurs with state courts\u2019 use of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, unconstitutional statutes remain on the books and individual constitutional rights remain unprotected.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">To read this Article, please click here: <em><a href=\"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2026\/07\/Steefel-final.pdf\">Unconstitutional But Not Unconstitutional Enough<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>When one imagines a judge deciding whether a statute violates the U.S. Constitution, the natural question that comes to mind is whether the statute violates the constitutional doctrine raised. And that is precisely what the U.S. Supreme Court considers. But\u2014as this Article demonstrates in an original fifty-state survey\u2014this approach is far from universal. In forty-four&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":67,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[25,14,711,709],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5479","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-current-print-issue","category-articles","category-issue-2-print-volume-111","category-print-volume-111"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5479","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/67"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5479"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5479\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5509,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5479\/revisions\/5509"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5479"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5479"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publications.lawschool.cornell.edu\/lawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5479"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}