The notion of \u201cexceptionalism\u201d has characterized immigration law for more than a century. Many constitutional and other traditional norms do not apply in the realm of immigration law. Venue, as prescribed and practiced in Immigration Courts, is yet another example of outlier conduct. Venue, a standard litigation norm, has been seriously perverted. Instead of protecting the parties involuntarily brought into Immigration Court, the immigration venue regulation vests exclusive authority in the government. As a consequence, the government not only has the sole power to initiate hearings about deportability, but it can also choose when and where to locate the proceedings. This allows the government to capitalize on geographical and legal advantages; it incentivizes forum shopping for venues with immigrant-unfriendly law in locations that maximally inconvenience the noncitizen.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Using the highly publicized deportation proceedings against Mahmoud Khalil as an exemplar of this largely invisible aspect of immigration law, this Article describes and expose immigration venue exceptionalism, the significant role it plays, the unfairness that has developed in recent years, and the urgent need for reform. It outlines a proposal to bring venue for Immigration Court back in line with general venue provisions that apply in U.S. courts. Immigration venue, like venue in general federal litigation, should presumptively be located in the geographic region where the responding party resides or where the underlying conduct took place. If venue is situated elsewhere, a motion to change venue should presumptively be granted in order to achieve proper venue. This approach offers a strategy to restore venue determinations to the pre-remote hearing era when removal proceedings generally took place where the noncitizen was located.<\/p>\n\n\n\n